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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Chaucerian scholars invariably note and
upon the poet's interest in
and human free will.

the

com.'1'lfl~:t

problem of divine foreknowledge

Some of their

number~

namely, H.R.

Patch~

w.c. curry, and espeoia lly B.L. Jefferson, in his Chaucer and
the Cpnsolat1on of Pbj.losophl of Boeth1wt1 have studied with a
degree of thoroughness the passages in Chaucer's poetry in
which interest is displayed.

The present writer, however,

believes that a more detailed and more aoc<:.rate tren tment of
the matter can be made by examining the views expressed by the
poet not only in the light ot Boethiuats De consolation&
Philoaophiae, but also with reference to the patristic and
scholastic teaching which influenced directly or indirectly
the minds of Chaucer and his contemporaries.

To ma.."!.!:e such an

examination is the purpose of this thesis.
Since Chaucer' a pr1.lc1pal sou.rce tor his observations on foreknowledge and tree will is Boethius, the thesis
will bet;in w1 th a au· 'l'l1&r'1 and an elucidation ot the latter• s
views as contained in the .fifth book of the De consolat1one.
Then will follow auccess1vely an explanation of the two chief
passages in whi.·h Chaucer deals with the subject, namely,
that of Troilus and Or1aezde (Book IV, 11. 953-1078), and
that of the Nun•a Pr1eat•s Tale (11. 3234•3250).

subsequentlz
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there will be eiven a reawne ot the .>atriatlc and scholastic
teachin

touci;ing {;he problem togetJ1er with un expos1 tion of

chaucer's attitude toward that teachinc.

should result in

!~"aking

This method of procedure

more intelllp;ible the passages ln

chaucer• s wr1 tinge o! which tllere la question.

In the .following

chapter, therefore, the aolu..tlon of Boetb1ua will be ".resented.
In the third chapter the Troilua passage will be d1acuaaed, and

in the fourth tt• pertinent linea of the Nun' a Priest• s Tale·.
The fifth chapter will give the patriatic and scholastic answer,
end the sixth will put !'crward certain conoluaiona whi0h the

writer has .formed in the course of h1a study.
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CHAPTER II

The sollltt or ur aoethius

Anieius Manlius severinus Boethius 6 a -Roman statesman
and philosopher, was born at Rome in the year 480, and died at
Pavia in 524 or 525.

He was descended from a consular tam117•

As early as 507 he was known as a learned man, and as such was
entrusted by King Theodoric with several important m1ssio: a.
When, however, his enemies accused him of dialoyalt7 to the
Ostrogothic king, allegtng that he plotted to restore "Roman
liberty 6 " and adding the accusation or aacril•g• (the practice of
astrology), he was cast into prison, condemned, and executed b7
order of Theodoric.

During his 1rnpr1aonment he reflected on the

instability ot the favors or princes and the inconstancy of the .
devotion or his friends.

'1'

'6S8

reflections suggested to

hir;'l

the

theme ol' his beat known ph1loaoph1cal work, the De Conaolatione
Ph1loaoph1ae.
By the eighth centUJ7 a trac11 tion, 1t'h.1ch became con•
stant, that one reason for his condemnation was his catholic
Fa! tl1 1 had as awned de.f'1n1 te shape.

In recent times or1 tical

scholarship baa e.:one to the opposite extremeJ and it baa been
held that Boeth1us was not a Christian at all, or that, 1! he was,
he abjured the Faith before death.

A saner view, 1t'h1ch seems at

the preser;t time to be prevalent among aoholara, 1s that Boethiua
was a Christian and remained a Christian to the end.

It 1s not

4

easy, however, to show from

document~y

sources that he died a

martyr for the Catholic Faith; nevertheless value should be r;:ive.n
to the constant tradition that he did.
He produce': works on mathematics, music, philosophy,
end theology.

His philosophical works exercised very groat in-

fluence on the development of medieval terminoloey, method, and
doctrine, especially in logic.

In fact, the schoolmen, down to

Boe~1ua

the beginning of the twelfth century, depended entirely on
for their knowledge of the doctrines of Aristotle.

They adopted

his definitions and -ade them current in the schools.
The best known work of Boethius is the De Consolatione
Philosophiae,

which was written during his imprisonment.

It is a

dialogue between "Philosophy" and Boethius, in which the Queen of
Sciences strives to console the fallen statesman.

The main

argument of the discou1·se is the tra:nsi toriness and unreall ty of
all earthly greatness and the superior desirability of the things
of the mind.

There are ev1 dent traces of the influence or· lteo-

Platonists, especially Proclus,.and little, if anything, that can
be said to reflect Christian inf'luenoes.

The recourse to sto!ciam,

especially to the doctrines of Seneca, was inevitable, cons1dering
the nature of' the theme.

It astonishes us that he should have

failed in his mome.n t of trial and stress to refer to obvious
Christian sources of consolation.

rprhaps he felt that a strict-

ly formal dialogue such as the De ConED latione should adhere
rigorously to the realrr of "naturi.l truth," and leave out of con-

5

Cbr1st1anity~

•supernatural t1PUth.•

'lhe work ta.lcB a up many problema of metapbya1CJJ as

well as of

e~11cs.

It treats of the being and nature of God- ot

providence and fate, of the origin of the universe, and of the

freedom of tbD will.

In medieval time a 1 t became one of' the moat

popular a d influential ph1loaoph1oal books, a favorite study

o~

atatesmen, poets, hiatoriana., philosophers, am theol.ogiana.

Ita

1ntluenoe may be traced in much of the literature of the Middle
Ages.

That the De Consolat!one waa a favorite study of the

theo~

logiana aa well as· of the 11 ter&IT men is evidenced by the ~
oua imitations under the title •De consolation•

~heologiae•

which

were read widely dur1ne the later Middle Agea.l
Now that we have considered these f'ew facta about

the life and works of Boethiua,
ot the present chapter, a

we

aumm~

are ready for the main labor
and an elucidation of the F1tth

Book of the De conaolat1one Ph1loaofh;1ae.

HoweveJ:', before th1a

matter 1s talcen up snec1:fically, a somewhat general sm:rrary ot
the whole Fif'th nook would aeem to be helpful.

aome necessary introductory detaile, th1a general a'lllllm8.ry
given.

~t

.,.r

~'heretore,

1111.

11 be

first let us oonaider the introduot017 details.
The disciple lies a1ok in his prison bed, and a

noble

and beautiful woman. the I.,ady Philosophy, 1e at hie bedside
inatl'U.Oting and ooneoling him.

In their conversation she sh.owe

that what men think to be chance 1s nothing more than the action

6

ot hidden causes, and that this action does not proceed from the
'willa 0'£ men but from God, Who wills it and guides its course.
This explanation prompts the disciple to aal<: whether or not

providence in Ria prearrangement of the action of all causes
holds the world in tbe grip
free will.

or

necessity, so that there can be no

The lady anawera by proving that man has a free will.

She goes on to say that there are

men destroy it when they sin.

de{~-;reea

or free will, and that

While speakinc ot sin, she ren•

t1ons tho d1 vine foreknowledge of men' a sinful volunt&rJ acts,
and by so doing raises a great difficulty in the vind of the dis•
ciple.

He etates his d1 ficulty.

He cannot understand how free

will in man can be reconciled wit.h the foreknowledge 1n God.

Thua

he opens up the subject of the Fifth Book, the reoonc11iat1on

or

manta free will w th the divine foreknowledge.

With this ex-

position of the introductory matter, the general suunary of the
Fifth Hook can now be

~iven.

Believing his difficulty to b'e unsoluble, the dis•

ctple now proceeds to give his reasons f'or thinking so.

It

should be noted well that in the whole of his argument he is ever
anxious to defend the foreknowledge of God.
is not, "Can the divine t'oreknowledge be

To him the question

reco~1ciled

w:t th rr·ee

Will in man?" but rather., can human tree will be reconciled wl th
the forelmowl'edge

or

Godt"

The d1 vine f'oreknowledge must be

4efended at all coat, even i.t it require the denial ot .tree will.
In the cnurae of his reasoning he also considers a eer,ta1n

7

aolut1on of the problem offered by other philosophers ac\jerding to
which free will is reconciled with d1 vine foreknowledge.
aolut1on he holds to be unsound.

:&:his

Jte concludes by commenting on the

sad state 1n which mankind is 1!' there be no tree Will.

It 1s now

~h.e

1'1rst

She first t'efutea thoroughly the arguments ot the disciple.

'this

Lady

Ph1losoPb7' s tUJtP. to speak.

done, she proves to be sound the ac lution to the problBm 'Vhich he
had

rejected, and finally enters into a long explanation ot it.

Her explanation concludes the Fifth Book.

IJ.he forecoing, then,

11 a brief, general summary of that part of the De consolat1one
in wb1rm we are presently intereated.

we are now ready to take up

the various argumenta of the Fifth Book in more detail.!
The

disciple begins by putt1nr; forth his proposition:

human free will 1s incompatible wi ti the foreknowledge of God.

Proceeding to his proof, he says that his propos1 tion ia true if
two principlea are true, first, that God foreknows all things,

and, secondly,by that God cannot be deceived in what He knows, i.e.
cannot have false knowledge.

Assuming that these principles are

self-evident, the disciple continues.

He points out that ac•

cording to the first principle all the acts of mc•a tree will
must be &rnown by God, and that aocordifl.g to the second He cannot
have false foreknowledge about theae acts.

Next the disciple

atatea that if a man did have tree will, God could not have
certain knowledge of h1a future tree will acta, but only
"uncertain expectationa."3

The disciple gives no proof for thia

8

assertion

her_~,

but puts it off until :rmch latar in h1a ap•ech.

For tb.e :.:resent he merely makes the assertion, and draws a conclusion frmn it as if it were true.

This conclusion is that it

would bo "impious" of' us to attribute to r.;.od the possibility of
having "unoerta1tl eXJ;eotationa" (aa men have oonoern1ng the

future).

It would be so because it would violate the principles

already- put forward.
wo·~lld

It would violate the :t'irat, because 1 t

not lmow all thingaJ for if I a.rn uncertain about the outcome

-

of some event., I cannot be said to know ita outcome.

It would

violate the secori.d 1n that it wa1ld a.dmi t the poss-ib1li ty of God
havivtg talae lmowledge of future free will actsJ for if I have

only "uncerta1n expectations" about aometh1ntj 1 it is possible that
rq Judgement about its outcome be false.

The 41ac1ple' a next atep ia to consider an adver•&r7' a
attempt to reconcile free will w.t th the divine torelmowledge, in

order to refute the latter• s arguments.

Before expatiating on

this matter, let un return to the d1aoic}le• a lmproved assertion

that "i.f man had tree will, God could not have certain :roz-e•
knowledee of his tree will acts, but onl.J' •uncertain expeota•
tiona."

Aa we have alread7 etated. the d1ac1ple puta off the

attanpt to prove this aaaert1on until later in his speech.

How-

the
ever, the preaent stage 1s more logical place for this "proot",

and as it is basic
be given here. 4

t~ th~

whole position of the d1aolple, it will

g
pUt

briefly, the proof is thiru God would have

:.,tain to Nlmowl!W;e of a thing 1lb ioh of 1 ts vecy nature
uncertain, and this would be false knowledge.
1s meant

abE~olute

( By "oerte.in"

certaint;r, not a high degree of' probability.)

On tl:e one hand, God must have certain foreimowledJ:e of future

treo will acta-- the two principles laid down at tlie beg1n.nir..g,
ne.m.::1ly, that Ood must Jmow &1.1 things, and that this knowledge
IDWit not be

talae knowledge, requ1re divine cartitu.de concerning

free w1 11 acts-- and on the other Be must have certi tud.e about
a thtng which of 1 ta ver'1 ne. ture 1a uncertain, a tree will aot.
Th1a apparent contradiction 1& what the disciple of'fara as tJ1<"!

bed-rock f"ounda.t1on for hia whole poai t1on.
heart of h1s line of argument.

It 1s the vecy

If man had free w111, his free

will acts as f.;ture things would be un, erta1n in their outcome.
The essence

or

free will 1s the powet• to choose between two nr

more poas1U1l1t1ea.

It is uncertain how a man will choose until

the time comes wten he actually makea his choice.
~oreknew

with certitude that He

wou~a

such foreknowledge would be false.
does not become a certain truth

Hence, 1f God

eventually make a choice,

M7 choice of A

~t11

instead of B

halt•paat r.dne otclock of

the morning of the second da../ of March, 1938, at which time I
actually cho'oae A·

Al.l ai:Jng tbrough the thoua&l:lds of past years

until now, it is just as poaa1ble that I shall choose B as A·

It 70u w1 sh to be certain how I shall aot ln a g1 ven c1rcum-

atance, you must walt unti 1 I actually act.

eue

4oea the

10
diaoiple ci ve reasons for his basic assertion. 5
tb.~

Let us now take

disciple's speech wi1ere we left ott, namely, where he begina

to consider an adversary's attenpt to reconcile tree w1~1 with
God's foreknowledge.·

The adversary' a arg·.;..-·ncnt is this, that thinrf!f do not
ooae to 1J&.ss because God f,)reknowe them, but God foreknows them
because they will como to pass.

The disciple's position, ac-

oordln(; to the assumption of the adversary, is that an act

or

the will which God fore1(Rows must come to pass because He fore-

mows it.

God's very .foi'Eiknowledge of

mceasi ty o.f the act• e coming to pass.

th~

act creates the

'l'ht' adversary argues that

this view is incorrect, since the aot doe3 not at all come to
paaa because God foreknows 1t, but on the crmtx-ary, God tore•

knows it because it will come to pass.

The advex-sary is concerned With finding out where the
causality

or

the

necess~ty

is.

He knows that the cause can onl7

be in two plaeea: either it is the foreknowledge of God, so that
.;;

this foreknowledge causes the neceasi t:, of future thiv.ga happEm•
ingJ or on thct contrar;r, 1 t !a the i'llture events themselves, ao

that they cause a kind
the necesa1 ty

or

~~r

neceas1 ty- in the foreknowledge of Ood,

God }"l..av!:ng foreknowledge of them.

By coming

into ,existence they make it necessary that God fbr eknow tha:m.
Wi tb this reasoninp; in mind the adversary lays down hi a

propoa1 tiona

It is not necessary that those things happen which

are :f'nreaeen by G,od, but necessary that God foresee those thi11.,;;q;a

ll
wh1ch are to come J or to put it un<>ther way, things do not corl1!l
I

to paas because Providence :t'oreaeea them, but Providence foresees
them because they will come to panh
advert~ary

VJ1 th this r.;roposi tion the

believes that he can save tree will.
The disciple replies to this argumentation by alleg•

ing that it is not to the point.

.Admittedl7, the necees1ty 1a

oauaed by the foreknowledge of God, or 1 t is caused (in a aenae)
bJ the future event.

But, eo the diaciple says, the question at

issue is not v,tJere the nece::H'i ty is; that is beside the point,
FUrther, it makes no difference where the cause is; tor wherever
it is proved to be, foreknown things must ha;;pen ot necessity.
He can tully adm1t his
hla own thel1a.
a man sitting.

advers~ry•s

proponition, and still prove

Thia he labors to do by means of the example

ot

In this example one kriows an event that is taking

plaoe in the present time before onera very eyes.

The d1ao1ple

otte't'a this example, although dealing w1 th the present, aa a
perfect parallel to God's foreknowledge ot a future event.
A man is s!ttinr; there before me.

a1tt1ng there, 1 t is necessary tut

Since he is

m:r judgment

that he ai ts be

true, so tar as my example is in perfect acc;.)rd w:. t;h the propoai•
tion of the adversarj.

An event ex1ats.

That event cauaea

neceea1 ty in rq knowledge of' it: :first, the naoessi ty o.f me
having knowledge of it (it is before me, I am attentive to it,

cannot help but know it); and secondly. the necessity of
knowledge of it bein£ true.

I

r:tt

Therefore, the causality is all on
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the side of t.h.e event.
',_0811ary

·Just as the adverafl.r'Y can sa:r it is

that G·od foreknow a th:lng becat\se 1t 11111 e.xiat,so I

can say in this case 1 t 1s necessary that I know this event
beeauae it exists now.
l.)ut I can also reverae the ;)rocess.

If i1fl' knowledge

s.s true, and true necessarily, 1 t is also necessary that the man
1 1t

I

a1n

there.

Therefore, I know the man eita there of' necessity.

certain

xot at a.ll1

of

1t.

And oo !

nut does 1113' knowledge cause that neoeasit,.,
ful:t~ill

the oth1:1r ·part of the advers&rJ' a

As the event of the tuture does not of necessity

proposition.

exist because God torek' ows 1t, so this event o! the present doea
DOt exi. at of' necess1 ty because I know 1 t now.

'J.'hua I hs.Ye ·in

this exar.1ple agreed perteot1,- with the adveraaey. and yet :trom

it I oa.n prove that foreknown things 1m.:tst happen or necessity.
When all 1s said and done, rq knowledge of the an a1 tting there,

am positive 1t is necesaa.r:r that he be

1lh1ch is neceaaar•ily true knowledge, tells me that the :man muat
be sitti11g there.

I

ai tt1ng· there.
A few linea further on the disciple applles the ex•
ample to the foreknowledge of' future eventa.

"Aa when I know

anything to be- 1t must beJ so when I know anrthing shall be, it

muat needs become.•6 Aa when I know a man alta, ait he muat ot
naoaaal ty 1 so i t I know he wtll sit in the future, he must ot
naceeal ty sit 1n the future.

He baa not the teee w:tll to avoid

11 tting in the tuture, neoeaai ey f'oro1nt:r him to ai t,

K7 tore•

13
nece~sity;

knOwledge of the event ia true, and true or

therefore

I can argue that the event itself must happen of' necessity.

It

But God must know

it does not, my foreknowledge or it is false.

all things, past, present, «nd future, and His knowledge of theae

IIUit be tr-:.le.

To conclude what muBt be

ot the example, .. mat is true of

a~dd

on the application

1rt1 knowledge of a present or

tuture event ia equally true of Oodt s knowledge of a preae•·,t
tuture event.

Ott

The adversary haa attempted to reconcile the tree

will of man with the foreknowledge of God by the proposition, "It
1a not necessary that thin s come t:.o pass beea,;;se God foreknows
them, but 1 t is necesea%7 that God foreknow them because they will

come to

~.:.ass.

The dise!ple has shown that even 1f this proposi-

tion be true, the fact rremains that fr'lreknown things must come to

paaa.
'.;:hus far the d: so 1ple has
poa1 t1on against the adv81 aary.

be~m

Bow he

merely de.tend1ng his

ta:,,~es

the off'ensive.

The

adYeraary cl,.,larly w1 shea to say that :tuture events cause the tore•
knowledge or God, in the tl..ue aense ar "-.he word "cause•·11
The

d~. se1ple

olttime 1 t is "absurd" to say that temporal

ehould be said to cause God• s everlasting foreknowledge.

event~

The

dieoiple does not tell ue vlhy 1 t is "absurd," but from lt'hat Lad7

Ph1loaoplq says abon t this later on, his reason
it the foreknowledge were caused by

that

tu::ure even te, 1 t would depend

on them, because cauaal1 ty i:mpl1ea desJendo:,:ce-.

•aod."

pl~obably 11

But the veey idea

il~Jpl1es absolute independence .from all other :..,e:tnga J hence

it 1a "absurd," that is, 1 t is a contradlct:t or: 1n te~~ma, to say

14
that t.JJe forek;::l.O'Wledge of s .ch an absolutely independent being
8

:r.ould depend on temporal events. 7, 8
~ith

this the dlaciple leaves the adversary aa en-

t1rely refutad 1 an.d offers the argument for his own position,

earlier as fl tting lr>gioally there rather than here where the
disciple actually puts it.

lbis argumemt ia the basis of h1a

whole posl tlon. and 1 t is very i't'l..vOrtant for t.he understanding
that pos1 t1on.

ot

It is tlle argument that if man had tree will, God,

in order to foreknow his .i"ree wi;l acta, would have to haYe cer•
ta1n foreknowledge of a thing which of 1 ts very nature r:ust be un•

oerta1n; in this hypotr1es1e God's Corekllowledge wo;.;ld be talae.
After givir:tg this argument the d1ac1ple considers that he has
proved su!'t'iclently that tree will cam,ot be reconciled with

God' e foreknowledge.

He concludes hie speech by enumerating the

woetul conaequences whi;.::h muat follow 1£ man baa no tree will.
/

There can be no reward for virtuous conduct, or punishment tor
eY11 coit0uot.

am vice.

There cannot even be a di.fference between virtue

furthermore, if there could be a1n, GOd would. haYe to

be the author of it. since all things happen of neoeaei ty' bJ the
will of Him V'Jho prearransed manta eve7 w.tll action.,. LastlJ, men
could not hope in God, and 1 t would be useless t.o prq to Him.

From tl'..1s it would .follow that all mankind would be separated

trom Him, since 1 t is hope and grace alone that bind men to God.
It is onlY' after she hae listened to the long die•

15

cour•• of the disciple that Lady Philosopq begins to express
her v1ews.9

The whole difficult,y in this matter, according to

her, is that we do not understand the way in which God knows

thins••

If we did have this understanding, we would have no

trO\ible in com.prehending how God toreknowa tuture things, and how

oontequently tree will can be reconciled w1 th the divine toreknowledge.

Later she will explain ()Od'a intellect insofar as it

ia hum&nlf possible.
1 peoial

In the meantime she will clear up the

difficulties proposed by the disciple.
Lady Philosophy first asserts that the position or

the adversary, which the disciple rejected, is indeed the correc.t
one.

Be it recalled that the advers817' s solution to the prob.lem

waa that things do not came to pass of necess·ty bec.use God tore-

mows them, but Pe necessarily knows them because they will come
to pass.

She goes on i.;o consider the ditticul ty, proposed by the

disciple, of the man si tt1ng.

In putting tort·; this example

the

diaciple admitted that foreknowledge did not at all cause the
neceasi ty or t'ut:.;re acta, but held that it indicated as a sort ot
aign the presence or the necesa1tr.
oulty with two anawera.

The Lady meeta this ditti•

The first is that one must prove the

eziatence of the neceaa.;.tJ betore proclaiming &l'J1th1ng as a sign

ot ita existence.
ot this reaaon.)

(One might justlJ question the probative toroe
The second anawer is that we should argue

rather from intrinsic causes trom signs.

(The Lad7 designatea

arguments from signa aa •tar•tetched" argumenta. )10

Thus she
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reeponds to the d1sc1ple•s argument from the example of the man
li tting•
wow the Lady goes a step turther.

She says that the

di•ciple has only one difficulty a ainst the adversary• a princi•
ple (later she will Show there are two important errors, one
depending upon the other, bur·ied beneath this difficulty).

'!'he

41eciple's d.If'ficulty consists in his thinking that tree will is
repugnant to foreknowledge or its own acts. - I.t' .Lady Ph1lost;>pb1
oan ahow there is no repugnance, the disciple must accept the
principle.
ample.

Her method of proof is to art::ue from a parallel ex-

She will tiret demonstrate there is no repugnance in the

exietence of tree will aots and a simultaneoua knowledge ot' thea.
She will then make the proper application to foreknowledge o.t'
tuture tree will acts.
Lady Philosophy regards as selt•eYident the existence

ot tree will acta which we can know While they come into being
before our very ,eyes.

One might indeed ask her how she can take

eu:ch tree will acta for granted, when the whole question urder
debate is Whether or not human free will exists.

Let it be said

in her defense that the exietence of God's foreknowledge is never
doubted.

The point at issue 1a whether or not this foreknowledge

negatives the possibility or human tree will.

Now the disciple

has no desire to deny the existence or tree 11111,

Hie d1tt1oulty

liea in the reconciliation of it w1 th a known truth.
the tact

or

'l'his truth,

God's foreknowledge, haa been established earlier in

17
th• D• consolatione.

l'he diactple is quite willing to admit the

esiatence of human tree will, if demonstrably it is not repug•

nant to the divine foreknowledge.

The lAdy is perfectly juati-

t1.e4, therefore, in considering tree will a self-evident truth,
1f she can remove the ap,;;-.rent contradiction

or

its coexistir..g

with God'• foreknowledge.
Lady

Philoaop~

man driving his horaea.
be IUCh.

argues from the example of a coach-

His actions are tree, and I know them to

I cannot argue trom the knowledge I have or the11, as

troa a s1 gn, to neoeasi ty in them, ( aa the disciple has done 1n
tbe case of the sitting

aen),

because the Lady has already re•

jeoted that line o:r.argument as tnvalld.

Consequently, here 1a

a case in wh1oh free will can stand with a knowledge of ita acts.
Jow

as free will acts are not repugnant to this present knowledge

ot the!ll, so tuture tree will acta ,. re not repugnant to fore•
knowledge of thet.lh

The parallel, eo the Lad7 alleges, is perfect.

Waturally enough, the disciple objects strongly.

He

denies theparallel, and he denies it on accou1t ot that basic
reason behind his whole poai tion which the wrl ter made eo much of

1n treating the disciple's own apeecb.

His reason, it wi\1 be

reaembered, was that if God foreknew th• event of' some tree will
aot, that foreknowledge would be talae, since a tttee will is of

1 te very nature uncertain, and uncertain th1 :-.ga cannot be known
w1 th oerti tude.

There· 1a no u.ncertainty eoncern1ng the ac te of

tbe coachman, for I behold thea coming into being before

mr

eyes.
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From a great number

possiole lree acts tl1e ariver has now

01.

aelected particular ones.

Before he made his

selection~

it

was~

cerU1n which he would choose, but now that he has made his choice
all uncerta nty has vaniShed.

Real things, i.e., free will acta,

ooae ir.. to exiaterLCe, ar.d I

know them wit. all certainty.

tbe oaae

car.~.

But

is quite different with tuture free will acts and fore•

knowledge or thelll•

A man haa not 7et made hie actual choice.

It

1a ur..certain what he will choose until the 1ntervenine time goes
b7 and the moaent comes when he actuall7 makes .h1a choice.

onlJ can hls act be the object ot certain knowledge.

Then

If before

that time I have foreknowledge of it, rn:r forelmowledge is false,
since

t~e

object of it ia a tb1ng whose very nature it 1a to be

uncertain in ita· 1asue.

Hence there 1a no parallel between knowl•

edge of present free will acta and foreknowledge of tuture tree
will avts.
Nothing daUb.ted, the Lady replies that though free
will acta are admi ttedl,- uncertain in themael.fea, nevertheleaa
the7 can be foreknown w1 th ce-etitude.

The disciple' a error, ahe

points out. lies in his bel1ev1Dg that th1ne;a are known 1n accordance w1 th their natures.

In actual truth the7 are known ac-

cording· to the tacul ty knowin{; them.
the following proof.

Of th1a assertion she g1 v~a

cona1der, she aa7a, aome knowable object.

In itself, acool'Cl1ng to ita own nat·ure, 1 t 1a 1nd1vidual. con-

crete, and present to ua.

In the scale of.' baing, ranging trom

the lowest tJP• of animal all the way up to the higbeat 1ntel•
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leotual being (God), there are
First

t 1~,era

fol~

kinds or knowing faculties.

is mere sense faculty, capable only ot sense

knowledge of o·cll' object, arid that only when the object 1.s present.
secondly, there is imagination, which also '·aA but

se~'lae

knowledge of the object, but which has the added power qf knowing

the object when 1t is abaent.

so tar we have two faoult1ea which

are lim1ted to the. sensible, the singular, and the concrete.

The

third faculty, man's intellect, can lmow our object 1n the

abstract, i.e., it can have universal knowledge
and highest faculty, that

or

it.

The fourth

ot God, has powers. of knowing the objeo'

tar above those peeuli&r: to the human intellect. .Thus each of the
four tacult1es knows one and the same object, but d1.fferently

trom the other three, and in a manner peculiar to ::.. ta own nature.
All this goes to show that a given object is not known according
to ita na tUl'e, but ace 'rding to the na tlll'e of the tacul t,- knowing

1t.ll Therefore the d:1.eciple car11:ot reject the parallel on the
ground that a future tree will ·act is by 1 ts ver'f nature uncertain
1n its !a sue, and so precludes all certain .forelmowled· ·e of 1taelf.
Jltevertheleaa, rejoins the disciple, it ia aeltevident
that men cam·.ot have certain knowledge of uncert':in .future event1

euoh as tree will acts are.
the human faculcy.

This waald be againat the nature ot

Thus reaaoning, he still deniea the parallel.

Lad7 Ph1losoph:7 admits t.."lat men cannot ha.ve certain t~>reknowledge
ot future events uncertain in their issue, since this is beyond
'he natural p·owera of the hlll"n&.n .intellect.

B~:t it ia otherw1ae
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with God·

His intellect is of such perfection that it can have

certain forelmowledf;e ot events uncertain in their issue, i.e.,
of tree ~~.:1.11 acts.

This peculiar power she calla the "si~plic1tT'

of the divlne knowledge.

It we could understand this "aimplic1t7",

we co·<tl(.i also unc:tersta:n.d how Cod ia able ·.:.o l.1.a·. e cel•ta1n fore•
knowledBe of events uncertain in their issue.

She will now

attompt to ex}.JlL·ln this elmpllc1 ty, and b7 so doing will solve
the disciple's last difficult,. against her "parallel."
h~ve

ahe w11J

removod the last prop of th.o d1 sciple• t.::: contention

that human frr:H1 will cannot co-exist VIi th
nl~:1o

she will

adversary' 8

Thia done,

d~.v1ne

fO!'eL"nowled(:;e.

Levo re.fv.ted ent1recy his ob.1ect1ons against hia

l11<<flfl.O;r.t 01'

80lV1ng

:t;.i'w &1Ji/8l"ent

contrac.Hotion in Cree

will eru:l forelt:nowledge, - against the use ot the pr:J.no1ple 1

"things do not of necessity dome to pase because God foreknows
them, but
oome to

c~od

of neeeeai ty must foreknow them because they will

pas~.;."

After some remarks on

o~r

proceeds to treat ot the eimpl1c1ty o.t

matters, Lady Pllilosophy
~Tot:.

to understand the divine flimpl1c1ty, one
of the "eternity" of God.

In order, however,

nmst have some notion

1his eternity o.f God alle def!I:;.es as

•• PE~r:feet pos~.HUJB1on altogether

or

an ondloss l1f~h" 12

The

meanint, of tho det1n1 t1on becomes clearer if we consider tempor·al
tblnga •

A ter:poral thing cannot embrace all the ::;;pace of' 1 ta

Ute at once, ae can the eternal beirl(\•

l'he life of tem;.,.,oral

be1nge can be divided into three sect1o: a_. present., past,

a.'P)(l
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.:; f·res<:r t section 1s that lite alone which :t t really

ruture·

poaaeas.... 8 ,• its past life has gone forever, ita future lite baa
6

not yet come.

'l'he eternal being, on the contrary 1 does posse sa

ita past and f'uture lite, and that together with its present lite.
The tact o:f ti1e aatter is that 1 t does not have a paat or .future
lite, but only life 1n the present, and this present ia ever•
\Vloat _is present to men is a

laatine•

1 1 present to God 1a everlasting.

~hort

fleeting moment, what

Thus does the Lady explain her

4ef1n1t1on ot eternity, i.e., ftthe perfect poesession altogether

ot an aadloss 11te.ft
She now connects t!'..e idea. ot etern.tt7 with the DiVine
intellect.

If

(Todt

s nature 1s eter:nal., it .follows the.t :Hie

intellect ll'Jlst be eternal.

As Godt a li.fe has no past or tutt.1re,

wt only an everlasting present state, so :·lso F1s intellect.·

He

does not lrnow things as past, present, and .f'utt..u'e, but as present.
God' a intellect lmowa two bod1ea r;f truth, J!ia own everlaat1ne

Ute,

ana

th.e 111'e of ')emporal th1rlfl8•

As the dit11na 111 ltnown tt.a

ao•th1ng which is entirely 1n a present state. so tefll)oral th1np:8
are known as someth1ne enti:r·ely in a present state, althoue)l
'eaporal

tl1i~~•

actually have a present and future state as well

•• a present state.

For exaq>la. a. : an YI111 live eig)•ty years.

Be Will havo performed in that ti:, e a great n.umber ot actlone.
At preaGL, t he is onl.7 fort:r years of ace.

P8r1'orm1ng certain actions.

At tho present he ie

God knowa theae present action::-.

22
. 'l'hef ~e, as tie Lady would put 1 t, "now 1n doing," and God
13
JasOWI. them as such.
But in the forey years past he has also

pert,:'l'med actions, and 1 n the forty years to come he will perf'orm

r h
1110 4

God knows these past and future actions.

the past and as ot• the future!

were. present.

No.

As ot

nut how?

He knowa them as 11' they

Re knows them, to repea't the words of Lady

Pb11oaopby, "as· if thq were now in do1ng."

In this Whole Da"G"&er· we are bot greatly concerned with
. man"' s past and present actions.

tuture actions.

We wish to .find out about his

How doee God roreknow theae tuture actions?

knOWs them "as 11' they

:w&N now

to talk o.f the foreknowlec:Ute
g e , but rather the

ot·

1n doing."

una.

knowle~e 01

ne

a newtT"

ne

Really it is 1nooM"ect

drHta

nut have rortknmfl•

.!"adin~-,

present.

All

the foregoing has been tor tlle purpose of explaining the
"s1mp11city" of Ood'a knowledge.

we can now define this

"s1mplic1 ty" as the power to know the pae t ani future as 1i' 1 t
were.the same as the present. aa 1f the past and the tuture were
now in doipg•

It 1a this s1mpl1c ley which &114lblea God to know

Our future free Will &0 tS With Certi tud,t: 1 tal thOugh theSe in

themselves be events uncertain 1n their issue.

Since God•a

intellect has such a power, the c1.1so1nl.et a last reason for
denying the pazell.el between our knowledge ot a coachman• s tree

will acts and God's foreknowledge ot'tuture free will acts falls
flat.

:Further, the Lad7' a explanation of the a1mplic1 ty of God' e

intellect has brought out h9w ats-Udng that p_.allel 1e.

!Joel's

torelalowled[.t;e is just aa much a lmowledge of something going on

in the present as 1a our knowledge of tho present itself.

IJ8dy

pbilosophy has completed her argument from. the example of the
ooaoblna::"'1 1 lberefr")m she haa proved that ther•e is no contradiction
between .free will and God t a t orekr&OWledge.

eYer,

so;~

111111t be

Ther·e remains, how•

obseur1 ty which must be removed• some ob jec t:tons which

answered.
The disciple can argue in th1e manner:

tree will acts 'ltlich some day

m. l"!

actuall~.-

r;od foreknowa

con1e to p~t.ss.

Since

tmch is the case. lily cannot I still argue thnt "vhat God tore-

knows will happen. and what actually wi 11 happen, must happen.
and is therei"ora necessfU'7?

The T,ady grants the existence or a

necessity, bn.t denies tl.tat this necessity destroys free will.
The will act referred to the divine knowledee is necessary, but ·

in itael.f 1a entiztely tree.

She explains this statement by her

distinction between conditional and simple necessity.

(Aa we

shall see, Chauoett mentions both types ot necessity in the

WUn•s Priest•• Tale.)
·when the ao t is r eterred. to the divine knowledge, 1 t
1a necessary with conditional neceaaity. 14 ~~t does this con-

41 tional. neeessi ty mean?

we ca."l understand 1 t better

by takint;

the example

or

free will.

If I know that he is walldne.:, he must or neeessi ty

a man Who is walking bef:>re us, supposedly of h1s

be wal.kingJ tor, as LaCly Ph1losoplq observes • "wl.tat a man kJ:,oweth
cannot be

o~"

than it is known."

The man. is lmown to walk.
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Therefore, walk he must, but his walkifltt:; is necessary only con•

d1 t1onallY - by the condition of my lmowledge.
owled{se 1 s the conr·\ t tion.

And so 1 t 1 s w1 th the foreknowledge ·

of God and our tree .-rill acta.

ot his

r~~reknowledge

Conseque~tly, 'llf1'

God by virtue of the s1mpl1c1 toy

Imow• the aot as if' 1 t were happening in the

ps-eaent before h1mJ therefore 'it must needs take place.
The next step is to inform the diaciple how thia
eondit1onal neeesm1cy is compatible w1 th free will.

a

1e

11811

wall~~-n[,",

that

I!W1

must be walldn;:·.- because lmowJ:,edge does

notl:J.i11g more thnn mirror real! ty.
Jdght not Lave vm.J.ked.

If I know

BUt before the man aet out be

While the men WPlka. it is neoeaaaey that

be walk; but be.f")re he eet ou·:.; it was not necess&r'J' t'Jlat he should

wallc.

ny ·the pO\Yer of his own free will the man b:roUBht the act

ot bla

walk~.. rl(;;

:tnto existence, am by r;ivi"S 1t existence made it

neoeaaar:n for all

(~xiat1ng

th1nes have a neoeeAi t;r.

Thus it was

b7 his own £roe w:1.ll that he coni"erred necess1 ty on this
O.e

~

act.

act cane into e:xistenoe it was necessary that it exist.

But it ttenended on man' a volition whether' or

not it shoWld ac-

tulN the quality of nocess1t.r. i.e., come into existence.

As a

•tter or fact, the man actuallT hae· determined to bring it into
ala\enoe

·QnC!,

Bod tore!mlm that He woulcb

In thts eense only it

la aeoeesaey that w11at God foreknowa happen.
15
Pld.loaopey explain con~~u. t1onal necese1 tv.
v

Thua does r.,ady

Bosidea th1 a cond.1 tional neoess1 ty there is anothe:r

.~~Sat ·. with which free \dll 1s not compatible.

and

th.1.~ ie
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•as..ple" necess1 ty.

aun rtaing.

or

A cood oxrunple :>f simple necessity is the

its risinc we cannot say, "1t mi~,ht not have

bappened," and "there was no neoeos1ty tr.at 1.t rise."

Before it

roae, the sun had to rise; there was no free choice in

such 1a the nature of simple necessity.

~1e

nmtter.

It ls really simple

neoeas1ty that the disciple has been deferdlng nJ.l along.

wow the

r~ady

is :full.7 prepared to meet the d1.ff1oulty.

ood torelmowa men' a free will actsJ therefr::J:ro

neoeas1ty.

happen with cond1 t1ona.l necemsi ty, yes.

m~n

will

so

T1·l~7f

r:-r

Cod fore1mows bot:h Um t

on a g1 ven morning in the year 1940, and

a

out walk1

•

must happen of

Th~~r~'" f'r·yl w:~.11 note

she makes a distinction.

aimple neoessl ty, no.

t~~e;J

The man will

'~~t

tb:~

tl:~.t o~
'Vflt lk

must

happen with
sun will rlse

the same

~n.o"t"ning

with oor..di tiona.l

neoeasity, therefore, .freelJJ the sun will rise

~th

~imple

neoeesity, therefore, without freedom.

The second objection 1s that it I have

fr~e

wi 11 I

oan obar.0e my purpose, and thus can truatrate the foreknowledge

ot God.

I should make 1 t fnlee, since wha.t God thour:ht I would

do I will not do •. The solution 1e tb.at sin!le the .foreknowledge

ot God is a Irn.o,Nledee of.· the present,

ne

lmows whether or not we

will change our purpose, and, it we do change it, whe.t the new
purpose will be.
Another question arises.

·When we change o·t.'.r pu.rpose,

4oee God• s kno"'\'lledt<se change w1 th 1 t, so that He has

ecls• tor

ray new purpose?

The answer is "no."

M.

new knowl-

There 1s just one
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JmOWledge o.f the present in which botl: ptU'poses are contained,

aince 1n <od'
tirat.

~;

knowledge our seco!'.!l purpo1:e does not follow the

}3oth exist sinru.ltaneously, and hence there is no chllll[';e.

pree will oari:'Ot cna:nca

Ciodf

S forelm.owledge of it.

Accordi:r.l(;; to Lady Philosophy this last solution also
answers that difficult!' which the disciple urged in his d.1 scourae
against the adversary• s principle that th.ini"UI do not happen ot
necessity because God foreknows them. but that God foreknows them

ot neees:1ity because they will bappen.

The reader wil1 recall

the discinlete holdinc it to be unworthy of God to have free will
aote as the cause of His foreknowled.P:e.

Applying again tJle

answer just c:tven, r.ady Philosophy woula avPr that such is not

. unworthy of rod, f!i nee those acts r\o not cJ·.;pnge his foreknowledge

an.'!. aro as JJrosont events to Him.

Since th1a is ao, His tore-

knowled{:;e does not dopend on our acta.

to make it clenr ti'at the

L~dy d.oea

such reasoning would seem

not accept the word "cause"

here 1n its ord.:1.nm-y mean1ne; 1 i.e., ae implying dependence.
aequently,

?irffl'~

con-

she defends the dictum, "our acta cause the fore-

knowledge of God• If she usee the word in a new aor..ae •
Th:t:tR once more .does Lady Ph11oaophy defend. the ad-

versary• a prj.nc:tple.

'J.'hus e.lao doe8 she n1eet the lest difficulty

atandln.g 1n the way of the reconciliation of tree will w1 th tlod' s
foreknowled(!'e.

Sho ends h~r speech by aff'1rm1ng that, since we

truly have £re~ will, and. since He :t'orel<:nows all our free will

acta, God car: j,~etly reward virtue anti pun.1ah ain.

further, m.an

27

oaft truly hope in God and pray to Rim.

She concludes

by advising

the dieciple to live a good life and to pray and hope. o1'ter1ng
•• a motive the tact that he lives in the aight
.po beholdtth all thinga.•

so

or

h1a Judge,

ends the dialogue l)etween La4J

pbilosophJ an&i her diae1ple aa aet 4own in Book v of the

-

~

conaolat1one Ph!l012J!h1&e.
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!Totes to Chapter II

1. catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II, P• 610.

-

2. In this che..:::,ter an attempt has been made to render faithfully
the:~ line of arcu,.,~ent proposed 'try noetl".J.us in Book V 1 w1 thout
reading into 1 t scholastic philosopl'.LJ' tor which there is no
warrant in the text. At times the writer },aa expanded what
seems evidently the thought of' Doethius more tully than it
is presented in the text.
In the disciple's speech, for the most part, the specific
ofder and the form have been preserved; however in Lady
Philosophy's discourse only tlw general order has been
to1lowed. Often the form has been changed a little, but the
sut·ata..nco of the matt<:::r has always been carefully retained.

3. Whenever the word "certitude" !a mentioned in this theaia,
absolute certitude is meant, never a high degree of prob•
a.bili ty.

4. The Lady's lons proof later on th~t things are not known according to their naturea but aecordinr-; to the nature or the
knowing faculty, ar.d her careful explanation of the simplieit,
of God's knowledge are both mostly intended to meet this
particular difficulty.

s.
6. This applLation in Boeth1us comes eir;ht linea further on,

a new obj$ct1on having intervened.
:572,52-54.

stewart & Rand, P•

7. The writers using this principle never Fteant that our free

will acts ca,.ae the foreknowledge ot God in the true sense
of th' word cause. To them the free will act was the essential condition or God's foreknowledge. A condition does not
1 1ply dependence. whereas a cause does. nere as in other
places, Boethius uses terms loosely. the exact terminology
or scholastic philosophy did not yet exist.

s.

Now comes the application (cr. }iote 60), and imnediately
follows the section on the impossibility or an uncertain
event becoming the object of certain knowledge.

9. Lady Philosophy says t...~t the disciple' a ~.fficulty in recon•

ciling free will with the foreknowledge of God waa vehemently
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pursued by Cicero in his Distribution ot Divination.
stewart & Rand, P• 382, 1-4.
Neither of the enawers seem at all to meet the difficulty.
nowever, the Lady'a explanation of conditional and simple
necessity, which comes later, does meet it quite well.
Anoter point to be noted is the fact that even though she
does not rive a satisfactory anewer, the reasoning is valid
because the necessity distinction, somewhat adapted, could
be introduced here.
11. This explanation is m:,re lmgth1ly developed in Boeth1ua.
12• Stewart & Ran~, P• 400, 9•10.
1~·

stewart & Rand, P• 402, 65,

0 Quaai

jam gerantur.•

1t. The Lady puts these ideas in a different fo~, but .ubstantially her reaaonine 1a the same as the explanation
15. noethius• explanAtion 1n this whole matter see""'a quite

~lven

.

accurate, save that he makes Godta foreknowledge the condi•
tion of the necessity. The type of necessity he haa explained would appear.present·even if God d~d not foreknow
the act. In a word, God's foreknowledge does not sean
responsible for the necessity in any way, even b7 wa7 of
condition.
·
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CHAPTER

III

The Lamentation of

In

C~pter

II was given

~roilua

11

summary and an elue1dat1on

of Book v ot ·the De conaolat1one PbiloBOJ!biae, the aolut1on
offered b7 noethiua to the problem

or

the recone1.llat1on of

huMD tree will and divine foreknowledge.

We are now read7 to

take up the principal pa•aagea in the vi tinsa ot Chaucer where•

in the poet treat• th18 aae-old. problem, and to &Qlatn what b.•

haa wr1 tten 1n the light or the teachiq ot DoethS.u, we lhall
t1~at

consider what we have entitled

•~he

Lamentation ot

Tro11ua, • an ucel'pt tPolll Book lV ot 7roilua an4 CP1aez4e, linea •

til to 1078.
Mr• B•L• 3etter-aon, in h1a Chaucer a1'ld the Consolation

ot PhlloaoE!!l ot Boetbtua, remarks that th1a loq puaage ....
taken over bod117 b7 Oha1loeJ- fi'Oil Boeth1ua, that it 11 rlrtual17
a poetical traulatlon.

In order· to ehow how cloae the tre.a•

'

lation 11, Mr. Jetteraon oomparea it with Ohauoer•• own prose

tranalatioa ot

~·

aama section 1ft Boeth1ua, po1nttng out a

oloae s1m1lari tt in phl"aelng, · and an al:rnoa t 1ndent1ca1 arrange-

ment ot 1deu.

According to Jfr. Jetteraon- Skeat• a obaenation

(Oxford Ohauoer IIa490), •that a oona1derable portion of tbia
pasaace 1a oepted, more or lea a c loael7 trom Boeth1ua,• ia UDder•

atatecl and. dal•a41ng,

Indeed the entire paaaage, w1 tb tll.e ez•

cept1on ot - . 11••• 1a copied. d1rect1J from BMthiu.,

Mr.

,.,

...
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;etters or: roes on to say the. t the few changes :made by Chaucer
••~"•

slir:ht, that they do not effect the subject matter, ,and. that

tb•f were necessary to meet the requirements of rhythm and meter.
we •hall have more to say later about these contentions of Mr.
Jefferson.

J:-'or the present it will suffice to remark that they

ue accurate, except that they ignore one important omission made
b7 chaucer.

In the following commentary on "The Lamentation ot

Troilus" we shRll refer to successive groups of linea as
•sections."

1'his procedure, we hope, will make our

1

comnu~ntary

more intellig!l:il.e, and provide tor greater facility in crossreterence.1
Section l
Goth Pandarus, and Troilus he soughte,

Til in a temple he f:)nd hym. al allone,
be that of his lit no lenger roughte;
du t to the pi touae godde• ever1chone
Ful te.-.ly he pre;r•d., and made his mone 1
To doon hym aone out of this world to pace;
For wel he though.te ther was non other grace.

As

950

955

And shortly, al the sothe for to seye,
He wae so fallen in despeir that day,
That outraly he shop ~ tor to deye.
For right thus ..... his argument alway:
He seyde, he nas but lorn, so weylawayt
"Per al that comth, comth by necessitee:
Thus to ben lorn, it i . a.. my ae•~•. "

Pandarua finds Troilua in a temple, alone and in
ooaplete deapair.
Paae

ue is praying to the rods to make him soon

out of thie world.

So fallen is he into despair, that he

1a utterly resolved to die, for this is ever hie argument:

He is
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411

t because all that comes, comes by necessity 1 and 1 t 1s his

tin7 to be lost.

Troilus has here stated hi a position.

tbe actions of a man's lite are ordered beforehand

iron-bound plan.

~~en

a certain

his life-time comes, he must of necessity

act according to this plan.
must now be lost.

lnt~

All

A.;cording to his own life plan he

There is nothing to do about it, and so logi-

cally he despairs, praying to the gods for release from lite.
Section
960

965

a

"For certeynly 1 this wot I wel," he seyde 6
"That forsight ot divine purveyaunce
Hath aeyn alwer me to torgon criaeyde,
Syn God seeih every thyng, out or doutaunee,
lnd hem diaponyth, tho:rugh his ordina.unoe,
In hire meritea sothly tor to be,
As they shul com.en by predestyne."
He knows well that Jod has foreseen that he will loae

criseyde.

("Being loat" to Tro1lua means, of course, his

pending separation from Crise7de.)

~

God foresees all .future

events and ordains and disposes them.
section

970

:s

"nut natheles, allas! whom shal I leeve?
f'or ther ben grete clerkea many oon,
'hat destyne thorugh ar,nlmentea prove;
And som. men 887ll that. nedely, ther is noon,
But that tre ohois is yeven us everyehon.
o, welaway! ao sle1gb.e am clerkea olde,
1hat I not ~hoA opynyoun I may holde •
.we now find out something mo:re about the extent to

Which Tro1lua believes the arguments he has been g1 ving.

•ars

He

that many great clerks have proved predestination;& but, on
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. . o1;ber h,and, scm men deny predestination entirely.
~

argued

80

Both sides

well that he does not t.;now which aide has the
n:_:,ut natheles, allas ~

whom shal I leeve?"

Section 4
"For som men aeyn, i t God seth al biforn,
Ne God may nat deceyved ben, parde,
975 Than moot it fallen, theiEh men hadde it sworn,
That onttveiance hath aeyn bet ore to be.
vlherfore I aey, that from eterne 1t he
Hath wist byforn oure thought ek aa oure dede,
We han no fre choia, as thise clerkea rede.
He tells what •som men aeyn" i.e., tells how they
d•tend predestination.

there were
arguments.
some.

mar~

Before (of. Section 3) he stated that

"grete clerkea" who proved predestination with

Now he is going to give one of the

~guments

uaed by

•hether or not tt.LOae using this argument are of the number

ot "grete clerkea" he does not say.

If, firat, God foreaees all

things, and, secondly., may not be deceived, i.e., may not have

false knowledge, then a tuture event which God roreaeea must
happen of necessity, even though men had sworn it would not.

With

th1a brief statement of' the argument, 'l'roilua also gives hie

; attitude toward 1 t.

It the two principles put forward by- these

men be true ('i'roilua states but one, but trom the context, it
can be seen that the other is implied), then, as these clerks
declare, there is no tree will.

To him. it appears that this

argument provea predeat1nation 1 altl::oueh he has already admitted
that the opponents of predestination can put up so strong a detenae that he is utterl7 unable to decide whether the7 or the

de.fenders o.f predestination have the stronger arguments.
di.t'.ficult to analyze his state of mind.

It is.

He expresses evident

dOubt, and yet seems inclined more to predestination, since he
1 , actinc on tl.ds h:y-potheaia. Until practically the end of his
aoliloqu:y he ar{:,<>tles to prove predea tina. tion.

In tt.is section begins the virtual translation of

soethi u.s. 3
theigl~ ~

'fhe addition of the phrases n for a om men aeyn,"

en hadde it sworn.," and "as thise clerkes rode, 8

do not change the thou.r)'"'t o!.' tt.1.e author o

the De Consolatior:e.

Up to this section Troilus is mo:r•e or less 1ntroducinc his subject.

Lis 1ntro:::·u.ction to the subject d'!.ffera greatl:r from that

which we have seen in Boethius.4
- Section 5
981

985

""

"For other thought, nor other dede also,
Vyghte nevere ben, but swich ~s purveyaunce,
~1dch may nat ben deceyved nevere mo,
IIath feled byforn, w1 thouten 1gnora.unce.
i'"or yf thor m.yghte ben a varis.unce
To wri then out frCJ Geddis pur':.reyinr.;e,
Ther nere no prescience ot thyng compynge.
"But it were rather an opynyoun
Uncorteyn.1 and. no stedfast .for,leyr,;ge."
Men cannot have a thought or

dec~d

which God does not

.foreknow, because l1od knows all things and eannot be deee.ived.
These words merely restate the two

pr1nc1pl~s

given ln the

previous section, an:i apply them to men's thouchts :'U'ld deeds.
Wow Tro1lus e:oes a step further.

If' t'len could escape this fore-

knowle~-:e by any means, the only kind of kn:ywledge left for God
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to h&Ve

their future actions would be uncertain opinion.•

In all this reasoning Chaucer

,.anslation of Boethius-

!!F'.pol"tant om:1sa:t on.
argument here.

1~

riving a virtual

At this point, however, he makee an

I.et us recall how Boethi us r...a.."ldloo the

Just as Tro1lus does, the disciple asserts that

there can be no free will acts, because tf t11ere were, God could.

not have certain foreknowledge of them, but onlr uncertain
opinior..

The disciple gives no immediate proof for this asser-

tion, but p".lts lt off until much later 1!1 h1s discourse.

For the

present l:.e merely makes the statf'F-cent and builds his ·ext step

upon it as if 1.7" were true.

It wlll be remembered that the post•

poned pr.oof consiated in this t.hnt God would have foreknowledge
of a !'reo will act, a. thing whlch of 1 tn nature is :.1ncertain and
. this would be ra·' se

this arvunent was

knot~~;ledge.

~~hf'7

An was explained in Chapter !I,

fc·:mdation of the disciple' a v<hole position.

Lady Philosophy spends a long tirre retutinr, wl:at she thinks is
the err•:)r at the root of it, n. ~'"nely, the belief that

known according to their nati.lres., when in real:l ty

tr:in~":S

the~r

aecordint; to the nature of the faculty k:lowing them.

A.re

are known

I''u:rthar,

1

she

sprm~

much time explrdning how God's intellect has

h~ ~ower

of knowing uncertain :f'tttnre eve::::;ts with eerti tude, this beeaus"
He knows the future as 1."' it were present.
proof

1~

of considerable

i~9ortanee

Thus we see that this

1n the speech of the disciple.

'l'he d:t flc1ple lntl.Woduees ~. t towards the end of hie di seo'!.ll"Se. 5
Just as Tr~ilua, he, in the beginning, merely :w..'l~{es a stateMent~
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and then builds on this s ta ter,~ent as if 1 t were true.

But

'l'ro1lua does not bring in the proof later on as does the disciple.

So Troilust speech, despite Mr. Jefferson's assertions,

is not quite a virtual translation of noethlue.
section 6

990

And oertes, that

we~e an abusion,
That God sholde han no parfit cler wytynge
More than we men that han doutous wenynge.
But swich an errour upon God to gease
''':ere f'als and foul, and 'til kked coraedneaae.

Tro1lus in. this section advances to the next step ot
his argument.

It "were an abusion" if

voo

had no more clear and

perfect knowledge than we have about future free will acta, 'i.e.

it He had nothing more tr..an doubtf'ul conjectures concerning them.
To deny God's havin[" perfect knowledge wo<:ld be untrue, vile, a
w1 eked abomination.

Chaucer is quite close to his original in

this section.

section 'f
995

1005

rt1::k this is an opynyoun of· some
That hal hire top ful heighe and sm.othe yshore:
':i.'hey seyn right thus, that thyr.g is nat to come
Por that the preso!enee hath seyn by:fore
Tr;at it shall come# thereof:re tl1e p...u•veyaunce
~oot it by:forn 1 withouten ignoraunce;

"And 1n this manere this neeess1te
Retorneth in his pal~t contrarie agayn.
For ned:fully byhoveth it nat to bee
That thilke thynges fallen in c~rtayn
That ben purveyed; but nedly, aa they sayn,
Byhoveth it tl..at t.hyngea whiche that falle,
That they 1n certayn ben purveyed alle.

3'7
"·oin~:

In this section Troilus is
11

to

r.~ive

very briefly

principle w:t th which the defenders of the other side attempt to

:reeono·tle free 'Wi 11

w~-

th the foreknowledce of God.

thiS principle r-m event does not come to
bu. t

therefore God

~own

it

beforeh~rd.

p~ss

beca~lse

According to

because God knows
"~Jd 11

1t

They assume that according to

the position of those det'ending predestination an act of the will
which God forelmows must co::r.e to pass because He foreh."'nOWS 1 t.

aod'e very foreknowledge of the act createP the necessity of that
aet' 6 eomine; to pass.

neeesnl ty of

th:ir:.~·s

!n a word, the foreknowledge causes the

happenlnp:.

a.ct doee not at all co!'1e to

1

l'hey on

pe.aE~

th~ir

side a.rf:"Ue that the

because God foreknows it {there-

fore that the foreknowled;:e does not cause the necessity of

r-oe

thinr:a happeninr:), b'ut on the contrary·,
it will como to
995-l()Ol.

pas~.

foreknows 1 t because

ne have now complet£:d the matter of lines

Let us examine then lines 1002-1008:

manere thla neceasite retor:neth in

hi~

"And 1n this

part .contrarie agayn, etc."

:rn the fut"J.re I shall perform some free will action.
Since (Jod knows all thinr"s, He nr...lst foreknow this action; her1.ee
the action, so to speak,

cau~es

the necessity of God•s foreknow•

ing 1 t, . e:1d on this account the adversaries ca.n Bay that the
necessity passes over to the other side.

It is not necessary

that those thinp;s happen whlch are foreseen, but it is necessary
that those thinr,s be foreseen which wt 11 hs.';)pen.
In this whole section

or

Chaucer,

~o

far a.a the line

argument is concerned ia quite close to his original.

Naturally 011oug;

ot

we u . ) not look 1n .'.. oethius fo1· ru; equivalont

1

chaucer' a nsome t'hat han hire top ful he1ghe end am.othe

yabore. •

Chaucf~rian.

such a phrase is typioall:r

section G
"! meno as thoug: I laboured me in this,

thJng oauae or which th1Jlg be:
wlle1ther that tha prescience of Ood !s
The certeyn cause ot the nocessite

1010 :r'o enquer'en wtd.ch
\S

Ot thyngea that to comen ben, psrde;

Or 11' nacesa.:. te or thyng oompJ%160
1015 Be cause certeyn of the purveyinge.

"But now n' enforce I

t".e

nat in sho"7nge

How tot:..o ord.l'•e tJf enuaes a tar~ t; but wol
That 1 t hyboveth that the bytallynge

1020

7i.()Ot

l

0£ thJ-7.\{.CS Wl f! te by!'::-;ron certe;:,"l'llJ
Be neceauar1o• al aeme 1 t nat therby
':hat preac.L.mce put faLI..y-;i.ge

nec~Hl;Ja:!.l'"'O

To thyng to come, nl ralle 1t faule or taire.
For tL.e aoJ:o ol.' clarity, lot us
Boethi us

(\~,om.

miasir~:

how

Chaucer 1:.;. !'o llow:!.n; qui c closely !n this a eo-

t1on} puts the r'lf.d ter.
1s

con;:~,ider

Accord!ng to tho disciple, his adversary

the ;.;>cint at iasuth

iho

Q.14CB

t: on the advt::raary l.s

trying to $-}ttle 1s -r.·hetian" .the .toreknowledce of

Jo~

oauae.s tl-.:e

neceaai t:; of the future act, or wil.cthor- the f·!.i.ture event, by the
tact that it will

tcreknor1inf 1 t.

~ouac

d.a;r ex! at,

cat.uu~a

t;·.o ,n';}cesz1 t¥ of Cod's

t,;ha t t:,e diac1_ple hl..msolf is tt•yin;;; to prove is

that whichever of the two .;;,ossl""lc· ar~swcre ia .:..,lvcn, the !'Act
l'erca.ine that c. th::nc fcrekc.own

t:r

God

CU.Bt

hb.i,'l,pon of necessity ..

Even £l'tl.nt1n£, tho CGr;ttmtlOn Of the ttdVEI!'Sar'f that for&knoW'lEld.t,e

dooa not cause the ncccws: ty of the or.;:curence of .future e.vrmte,
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nevertheless,. foreknown things must necessarily come to pass.
The disciple then coes on to prove from the example of the man
sitting that a thlnt: foreknown l!!!lSt happen of necessity, admitting
for the sake of arcument that the foreknowledge does not cau.ae

that necessity.

section 9
1025

1030

1035

"For if ther aitte a man yond on a aee,
Than by neeees1te blhove~ it
That, cetttea, tb.7tl op,-nyoun sooth be,
That wenest or oonjeetest that he a!t.
And further over now &J&rnward yit, .
Lo, right so is it of the part contra1rie 1
As thus, - nowe herkne.- tor I wol nat tarie:
• aey 1 that 11' the op:vnyoun of the

Be soth 1 for ttPt he sitte, thrn sey! this,
That he mot siten by neoeasite;
~.nd thus necessi te in eyther ir'.
For in hym uede of e1 tt,.nge 1a, 7"78 1
And in the nede of seth; and tLus, forsothe
there mot naceaa.ite ben in yow bothe.

Troilus eives an example of .one• a knowing a fact
which 1a present be.f·:'tre him; this exa..,Tllple he o:!'fers as a parallel

to God's foreknowledge of the fUture.

A mnn is sitting there

before you.

j't:d{~emont

true.

It is necesaal"Y that your

"the r:Jan efts" be

(Neither Tro11us nor the disciple tell us the reason for

thls neeess1 ty; probably 1 t would be the following: 1 t is

;.;~r

teotly evident that the r:an s1 ts 1 and in the race of such stttong
evidence one must of necessity have true ktowledge.)
JOu oan reverse the process.

true, then the man

or

If y::ur judger:1ent

necessity nru.st sit.

or

Further,

t.'le sl tting be

There must of

40

neceae1t:r exist a tact to

w~::lch

7:ur juagement con.ror:u.

f.t'hua

there is neceasi ty on e1 tlun• aide, or your ' judgement' 1 being

true, and. of the man e1ttint•

Chaucer adhnx-ee closel:· to Boethiue

1n th1a aeetion.

aeot1on 10

••Jl'l,

"But thoW IDAJ'&t
the nu1 a1 t nat t'ber•tore,
That ta:1yopynyotm or 'b1a fd tt~e soth 1aJ

nut rather, tor the IIIah a1 t t:1er lqt'ore,
1040 therfo:re 1s thJn ~ soth1 JW!••

A.rMJ. I . .,.., t.hougn the oauae ot aoth at' this
comth o:t h1a 81 tt'J'ng, r•t necea~1te
11 on troonaunged bo t.h in ltyJi!t ~ the.

nut 7ou. J?lft.Y aay
truth or y0ur

J~semontJ

~

cau.ae of the a1 tt1nc 1e not the

but on the contra.t'7, the t:rutb ot 70\tt"

judgement !a eauaoo by the ~ti tting.

the oaua• o£ the neoet &1 ty
1

c~•

~'be

al'l8Wer 111 that, althO\lgb

onl7 from one a:tde, hom the

man 11 tt1ng, there 18 a oommol'J. neoeaai ty on both aides.

In the

previous aectlon Tro11ue npldned ..tutt he Mant by that co=non
neceaa1ty.

'!'hare 1• tho neoetsity ttutt

the ntteetut.i ty

ot t.he

yo~Jl'

opinion be true, Al'!4

man sl tt1na·

the comrr:r..)Jl MCG8S1 ty, the worcsa Boetb!tUJ uaea to expretta 1 t ...

"COlllmm1s 1n utraque necea1 taa." 7

ChaU.081' l'et'ld.eH theae wnl'tla

•yet neceaa1 te ia en treohaunged both 1n b,1a and the ( l1MI 10481043) •"

About ttt1a c<mm10!\ nece•n1 ty

l1r.Jettereon eayet

aoethiua i.s torce4 to palt ti'lollt A doea not a1t
down because fl' • opinion wu trtte, but that the
opinion was W'-» beoauae A aat down. Yet he :re.
•••et• lamely, tba t then wu a oomtttem nec•s•i t7 1n
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.,won caused the e1 tt1ng.

trom

What he 1s atternpt1ng to prove

his example ia that an existing tact which 1a known Jm18t be

. •oeaaa1·:':r, even though the knowledge did not cause 1 ta _exiatence.
s• it recalled that Lad7 Phlloaophy stated upllc1t.lr that the
41eoiple uped •• ft-Om a algn to the neoeaai ty ot the mm
aitt1ng.

40••

He believed that the a1gn 1nd1oatthi the neceee1t7J he

no4; aay that 1 t cauaed the neoeaa1 t7•

For a better understanding of the whole
!rOil~,

aol11~

let it be aaid that 1t contains three tallac1eaa

ot

rlrat,

ln the ca.ae or the man a1 tting, Tro1lua 4oea not 41at1nguia don•
41t1onal neceaaity trom simple neceal1tyJ aeoondl7, he b.ellevea
that uncertain th1nga cannot be known witr: certitudeJ th1JNU71 he

W.nka that th1nga are lmown 1n aces ordance w1 th their natures,
when as a matter

ot tact the7 are

lmown according to the nature fl

blmonns taoulQ".

Section 11

•Tbua 1n tbia same wise, out of doutaunce,

1045

I may wel maken, ae 1 t aemath ae,

11 •••onJ118 ot Oo4dea pmtVe,..unce
And ot the
that to comen be;
a,. which reaoun men ...,. wel yee
That th1lke thJqea that 1D ert'be talle,
'1'ha t b7 ne ceea1 te they coaen all.e.

tbfn&••

Bow Troilus appl1ea hie

ot God.

e~le

to the toretnowle4ge

In the aame 1f&7 that he p-gue4 collOernil:t.g cme' .s knoWl•

Ide• ot a am ai tt1ns. be reaaor..a r6lat1ve to

•4&• and

God• • t()relmowl•

the things to come, holding conaequentl7 that ev.r7•
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_.... on earth happens b7 neoeaa1tJ.

Section 11
•:ror althou~ that, tor thyng aha1 come,
'lhertore 1a it purvQ'ed., oerteJl'l17,
wat. that 1t eomth tor 1t purveyed 1a;
Yet .nathel••• b1hoveth 1 t nodtully,
1055 That th1ng to come be purveyed, tr..elyJ
OJt ellee, tlq'Daea that purve784 be,
That the7 b1t1den by neoeaa1te.

7"1••

•ADd thla autt1aeth rlght JDOugh, certe7n,
For to deatroye oure tre chota eve17 del.
Alt~

Ohauoer 1a -.kiDS a Y1rtua1 tra.nalatlon 1n

tb.la aection, h1a •tter la a0111what oontua1nth 'l'h1a la the fault
ot :aoethiue, who b1raee1t 1• none too cleu-. 10 At th1a
of

•tas•

the dlacuaa1on~ tb.e 41ac1ple1 an4 Tro1lua alao, haa t1n1ahe4 wit;h
hia example ad haa made b1a appUoatton.

ot a

·~ of all that

. ciple of the a4YeH&J7•

low be givea aoaething

he ba• aa14 ld.noe

he proposed the prin•

1&18 the d1ac1plet

•It 1a neceaaat'7

e1 ther that the tuture eventa be toreaeen b7 God, or that thlnga
toreaeen happen.•

!ro11ua puta hla idea ln the worda ot the

preaent aeotlona "Yet natheles, b1hovetb it nedtu11J, that thine
to ooae be purcveyed, trewell'J or ellea, tb:Jngea that purvqed be,

'hat they b1t1den by neoeasite.• Aa the reader reoalla, this 1a
~.

question which Boetin1ua held that the adveraariea were
'

M aolve . _ . tbe,- put forward their principle.

taa

trJina

From hia r•aaon•

he haa aa..S.ngl7 proved that whichever way you solve th1a

••tton, the taot rema1na that th1nga torelmotm. muat happen ot
U.eaa1 t'1•

.t.a 'l'roilua pute itt

"And th1a auttiaeth )1lough1
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e.rteyn, for to deatru7e oure tre oho1a everr del.•
In the worda which begin th1a aeot1on, •por although
~bat,

tor th7ng ahal eoae1 JW7a, therefore 1a it purve7ed,

oert_,nly, nat that lt.coath tor 1t purveyed ia," Tro1lua, like
the diac1ple, .ia merelJ' ree.alling the tact tb.&t 1n

rro•

nie reasoning

the example he has granted tor the sake ot argument that the

e"fent does not happen ot necessity beoauee God foreaeea lt•
Sect1c-n

11

••JD.

1080 •But now 11 thie abue1oUll, to
That tallJflg ot thJD«ea teaaporel
Ia oauae ot Ooddee pr.1cle»ae eternel.
B01r trftel.7, that 1a a tala aentence,
'l'llat thJD8 to oo• lbo14e oauae h1e J»reaoienoe.

106& ttwbat JQ'Pt I ...... and I baAU n1oh a tllouaht,
But that God JN"'878th thJD8 that 1• ·to eoae
For that 1t 11 to com., lft4 ellle aou&btt

tlv'DI••

So .,thte I ••• that
alle a!Jd some,
'l'laat 11b.11• be 'b7ta1le u4 OTerco• 1

10'70 Ben oauae ot thJ.lke aovere,.ae. p
purveyaunee,
That torwoot al w1 tb.outen lpD!taunoe.
'!'hue

tar 'l'ro1lua hu been 4etetld1ng h1a poet t1oa

qalnat the pr1no1ple ,of the a4Yeraar1eaJ .now be takes the
ottenae againat 1 t.
bappeDS.ng

tdce.

It 1a abaurd, he aqa, to say that the

ot teJ19oral th1nga 1s

The a4ver•e1ea, w1 th

the oauae

the~r

ot God• a etemal lmowl•

prinolple that God foreknows

th1naa because the7 will come to paaa, equlvalent17 • .,. that
hture eventa cause 111• toreJmowled.ge, and further that all the
thtnga wh1oh haYe happene4 1n the put have uarc1H4 thia

..'"'ality.
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SMt1on

14

•And over al tbia, 7et aey I .ore harto,
That right aa whan I wo t ther 1a a thJng,
I,.a, that 1d1J'n& JIOot ned.tul7 be aoJ
1075 Ek right ao, wban I woot a th)"n8 OOitJng,
so mot 1t OOIIItJ and thua the b1tallYJ1!!
Ot thyngea that ben w:tat b1tore the tide,
!'hq ••• nat bon eaohued on no qde.
Furthel'tmore, aqa Trollua, •••n aa when I know there

lJ a thing, that thiq aat exiat ot neoeaa1 Q-1 m alao when I
pow a thing 1a coming, that thlllS IIU.at come of neoeaa1t7•

t;hUa the comins about ot
anTW1•••

~ns•

rn tb1a ••otlon

An4

torelm.owrl oannot be prevented 1n

he la harJd.n'l: baok to t~ a1tt1ng

ex•

aple and appl7ing 1t to toNknowledge ot the 1uture, which ap•
pl1oat1on he haa alrea.dJ ll&d.e, thouQ'l 1mpl1c1tl.7• (ct. linea 1064·

1o.i'7.)

'l'h1e epp11oat1on aeema 11g1oall7 out ot place here, be•

oauae the aeotlon 1.._41atel7 prev1oua begtna a new line ot
thoU&ht•

However, 1 t la to be noted that 1n thta aeotion, 1here

Chauoer tollwa hia or1g1nal 1n all reapecta, the appl1oat1on 1a
clearer 8l'ld more expUc1t than 1n the ft.trrr.er one.
Thua doea T:ro1lua en4 bla argument b7 which he tr1ea
to demonstrate that tree Will oannot be Noone! led w1 th Oodt e

toreknowleqe.

Aa we will :reoa.ll, tbe d1so1ple doea not leave ott

at tliia point.

The latter aext g1vea ua that important proot tfllf

hla aaae:rt1on that GOd cannot have toNJmowleqe ot tree wilf aota 1
~ lhlt only unoerUJ.n expeotatlOAe.

•.., •.,which are ot their

Y81'J'

!he proof waa that htee wt.U

nature unoertain~oannot be toralcnown

111\h cert1tu4e.ll Tl'o11u olld.ta thia proof ent1rel7 troa h1a
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1 peeoh,

which otherwise la a fairly close translation ot

aoeW.ua.

After tJd.a proof', aa waa pointed out in Chapter II,

the d1ae1ple considers his poai tion well enough defended.,
and
. .
GonelUd.ea b7 anumerat1ag the woe.tul thine,a that must be true ot
•n if' b.e has· no· f'ree w111. 12
Section

Tha.nne aeycle he tbua,
'l'hat wooat ot al this
aewe on 7113 aOl'We, and
Or brrng Criaqde and

15

"Al.Jqghty Jove 1n trone,

th7n8 the aotbtaatneaee,
do me de7en aone,
·
me trom tb1a d. . treaael"

And whil he was in al this hev,nesse,
D1aputrn! with b:Juelt 1n this matere,
Com Pandare in, and aeJ4e aa 7e Jna"f hex-e.

tt.o1lua ooncludea w1 tb. a prayer to Jove.

•;oye, he

t&J'a, •7ou who lmn the truth or this •tter, pltJ' .,. sorrow aDd
11 t •
treaa.

die eoon, or else briDg Or1a.,-de and •

out or tbia dis•

Chaucer then adds that, llbile Troilua waa in the midst ot

Wl11 sadness and aelt-41aput1ng 1 he ws.a interrupted b7 Pandar\la.

It would be well now to . , . up the att1 tude ot mine!

which 1'ro1lua manite1ta in hla aolll0flt17 regarding the

foreknowledg..t.ree will prObl...
aDd

s, Chaucer tells us that

rn 11ne1 944•96?, aeotiona l

'.l't-oilU. 1a all alone in the temple,

oar1ns no louger tor Ute. and pt-aying to each ot the gods to let
h1a eoon paaa out

or

this world.

favor tor b1m but .death.

H• tb1nka there 1a no other

lf• hae ao oompletel7 tallen into

cleapalr that he 1e utterly reaolYed to 41e.

Chau.cer 1sned1atel7

aaa1gne the reuon tor th1a attitude (•tor right thus was h1a
arsu-ent al.wa7a•).

A:ll thlllge happen b7 neoeaa1 ty.

It 1a
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neceaaary that he be loat, i.e. be separated trom Or1aeJde.

He

mowa well that God has toreaeen that he Will lose her, and there
11 no doubt but that God toreeeea and ordaina and

aa they haYe deserved

them

to be.

So tar Tl'o1lua 1a quite eertain about

•tter.

d1spo~ea

But now doubt ontera hie mind.

~.

whole

He remarks ( aeot1ona 3

and 4) that ancient cle:rke have ao cunningly al'gue<\ ·torasalnat predestination that he 1a not able to

baa ha4 the better of it.

~u4c·

and.

which aide

His attitUde ot mind. has changed from

one ot certitude to one of doubt.
In tb1 e a tate ot mind he prooeed.a to g1 ve a long line

ot arsument which •••• to
5 to 14).

h1a to prove predeat1nat1on ( aeotl.one

Be doea not give the argwanta on the other aide.

preaUII&bl7 tlMJre are e'tPong

~~nta

Yet'

tor tbat a14e, atroq

eno\llb to prevent Tro1lua troa boldina the neo"a1 tartan
ph1loaoph7 w1 th oert1 tude.
When he haa oonoluded. h1a reasoning, he

otters a

pra7er to Jove which 1a pertectlJ' 1n accord w1 th h1a 4oubtful
a tate ot minch

Jove knowa which aide is true.

therefore, that tree Will cannot be reconciled

If it 1a true,
w1 th

God' a tore-

knowledge, and that all happena of neoeasity. then he IIUat be
aeparated trom cr1ae7de.

possible.

May Jove let h1a die then aa aoon aa

If, on the other, hand, there can be tree will, and

oonaequently the poss1b111tr of avoiding the separation, he praya

that Jove might

•b~g

Cr1aeJde and me tro th1a deatreaae.• Thua

hta tinal atate ot m1D4 ~ell81na one or complete doubt.

:rrom thia soliloquy ot Trotlu, Wba• . _ we

''

~....

0~

Ob&uoer• s on attitude towud the 'Oroblem of raooncS.Uq .,...
rill W'1 th the d1 Yine torelm.o1rledgef

we can leam but 11 ttle.

It

1a always Trollu who speaka, n...-.r Chaucer hlmaelt, and alnce
'l'nllua 1a •u•••l:r a tiot1t1oua oba»&Gter, •• oannot attribute the

•••U.Onta ezoreaaed bJ' 111m to the autboP.

Moreover, we musts

· N._beP that Tro11ua ._. auttered. bitt_. m1afortua.e at the tlae

of Jlla ll:loo!Q' .•o1110QUJ'• ad tbat it ia in k•epS.ng with h1a
prea•t d1apoe1ts.a to ba'Ye a rat2ber d.eapairl.Dg view ot the atate

ot

ltldlk1n.d.
Pert1n~nt,

per~a,

to the queat1o.a

or Ohauoer•a

att1,114e toftl'4a the •••••1tanan phllo••thJ' put tC1'1rard b7

Tro11u, is the JUnner 1a 'lhich he ooncluea h1a •U1lel tragedy•'••
ascend~

Athz' Tro11u1 • • slain bJ Achillea, his treed ap1r1t
bliaah.llf ·f» the e1~ th sphere ot heaven.
wa~r1ng

There, beholding the

atara and listening to the heavenl7 melody, !'ro1lu

began utterl7

to

4eap1ae thia wretched warld, and

to

hold all

mun4ane pleasures t.o be Yard ty in comparison to the tull tel1o1 t7

ot heaYen.

•YJ••

An4 down hom thennea tute he gan
!hle l1tel spot of er~•• that with the ae
Km'bl'aoet1 ia, and tully gan 4eap1ae
!hi a Wl"eco.ned wo:rld• and held al van1 te
To :reapeot of pleJD. tel1e1te
That la 1n hevene above. (V ,180'1·1819)
Chau.oer thereuopn po1nta a moral.

He a4Y1aea 70\JDI

tollc to forego th.S.I' • rldl7 'Yanity, and. to ca•t tbe1r qea upoa

the God Who •de th •

1n Hie image •

The7 ahould not aeek

"feJUede loYea" after the manner of Tro1lue and Cr1.,Me; but

rather center their wholt affection upon their creator·and
Redeemer,

"a'yn ha

be•t to love 1e. •

~om

the traGtedy of.' Troilua

theae 7cnmg tolka may ... ot' wha\ little . 110rtm were the "pa,-ena
oorae4 olda ritaa," how little •va1led the worship

or

the gada,

what little reward fC!' toil waa g1ven by Jove, APOllo, Mare, and

•Wichraso,.".lle.•
undAt~t

Such-reprobation ot the whole pap:an aystem

which the tiotltioua Tro11UII has hie being argues atronglJ"

aga1nat thet view that ChaUcer 1a 1nd1oat1ng bia own op1n1on 1n
the aollloquy ot '1'1'011ue wi.t.ich we nave been oona1der1ng.

have aore to aq later
the pr6blel'll
buJUa fltee

or

regard1~

we shall

Chaucer'• own attitude towartta

the reoono111at1on ot divine for-eknowledge and

wtu.
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Hotea to Chapter III
All Chauoer1an quota.t1on.a are from TP!Jt<»pJ'~ Jorka ot
Mhauoer, Student' a Cambridge Ed1 t1onJ
7 F.tt.
o'Siiison (aoaton1 Houghton tltff11n CompallJ', 1933).
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Predeat1nat1on 1·• never u.•ed. 1n tr.J.a theaia in tb.e teChideal aenae 1t haa 1D_ Catholic theolog.
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~"-'•

1. 6•10.

Ibid., p. :Sftl, 1. 1•6.
'· -Ibid.,
1. 55-81.
P•

5.

3'16,

6.

Ibld., P• 374, 1. 18•31.
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-
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Ibid.,

P•

3'16) l. 40.

10.

Stewar• & Rabd, P• 376• 1. 41-46~

11.

Ibid., P• 171, 1• 66-81.

12.

Ibid., P• 3'18, 1. 81•llt.
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Chapter

IV

ohant1aleer and DeltlDJ"
This ohapter w1 n have to do w1 th the aeoond paaaage

in 11b.1ch Chauoer dwella t• aom.e lefllth on the problem of

reooao111ng the free will ot aen with the foreknowledge of GOd.
'l'h1a aecOJld paaa4'ge noura 1n the l'un' a Prieatt a 'l'r.le, linea
3110-3150. · ·Aga1 n Chaucer la 1n4ebte4 to the De oeaola tlone.

Ot the

thr•• cUfferent tnnera to the problem which be propoaea,

as haYing been ott•ed b7 the olerloa, two are 4er1ve4 trea
Book V.

Aa we will remember, La47 Phlloaopl'q 1n her solutdon

cl1at1Dg\l18he4 beween two k1J'l48 of neoeaa1t'f1 cond1t1onal and.

a1aple.

Moreover, the poa1t1on defended b7 the d1ao1ple baa

beeD lb.own
nMeaa1 t7•

aa

equift.lent to that ot o~ uphol<Ung a1mple

In the paaaqe troa the lha1' a Pr1eatt s Tale, 4DD4l•

t1ona1 neoeaa1tJ and a1a,le.naa•••ttr are given aa reprea•nt1ng
two ot the tbl'ee arunrera to t.he probl••

fJ.'he whole ot tbe J\1.1\f • Prleat• a Tale 1a 1n a la'lw>reua,

•ok•hero1o tone • The genlal ohap1a1n haa juat tinlahM. tellJ.ns
b.cnr Ohant1oleer, who had ben. ...,..d

bJ' h1a dreama not to go ou'

late the JaN that • • 1a penua4ed 'b7 hS.a wite, Dame r-..tlet,
•• 41aregar4 them.

Cbant1oleer 1a now 1n the yarct w1 th b1a h•raa•

an4 • fox 11•• hidden,. awaiting h1a ohance to apr1ng on

hl••

'!'ben tollowa the ph11oaoph1eal reflection 11h1oh •• have to oon•

alder. and the t1r•t part ot wb10h we have calledt
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section 1
0 Chauntecleer# aou.raed be that morwe
'!'hat thou into that 7erd :tlaUE#l tl'o the bemea1
Thou were tul nl J'WarD&4 by th7 dremea
'rhat thilke 487 was perilous to thee J
But what that God f'OPwoot moor nectea bee.
3255 After the opinion ol certa1n elerlda.
W1tneeee on ~ tma• •7 pa:rfi t olerlr la,
~hat 1n aool& ta greet alteroac1oun
ln thts mateere, and greet d1aput1aoun,
And haUl been or an hundred thousand men.
The mornlng on whieh Ohant1.oleer tlew :t:rom blfl

ratwra

yard 1a accuraed.

1n~o the

d.r•- that the

eta)'

wu to be

He waa :f'ullJ'

per~

to h1aJ

uno•
or

haYe remained at home aTY1 aot ,.,;t,tNtd ttorth.
WS.l~

WAJWD8d.

b7 hie

he ahoUld

hili own

bee

desp1 te evident 'I!Pam1:nga# he was walking into tbe tace

<ianS•r•

or

But attM' all, was he Hall7 aot1ng w1 th tree w1llT

he no'b rather

t~oed by

neceaa1t7 to act ••

he

did!

God

waa

to~

that he would go 1nto the yarc.t that 4q, and •what God torwoot

moot ne4ee bee, atter the oplftloun of om-te1 n o lerld.a.•
But tlutae clerka do aot have evtti'Jthin£ their. oa

•7•

The question haa been hot1y debated.

Arrt olerJc 11ho

lmowa

h1a bue1neaa oan bear w: tne8s to the taot that thC'e 18 now a
pea' altercation and 41apute about th1• matter, and has been 1n
tbeput.

A hUbdl-84 thoUeand. haw 10\llbt over 1t.

something Will

..S.d. S.n the n&xt chapter concerning the h18tor1cal a•peot

41eput1ng.

But I

M

lean nat bulle 1t to the

bren•

or

th18

As kan the hoolJ doctour August,n,
01- Boeoe, cr the Blaahop Bradward,Jn,
Whe1 ther that Godaea worth)" torw! t'1J'1S ·.
Str.,-neth • nedely tor to doon a tl4'J'C, ...
"Nedel,. elepe I eJmPle neceaslteeJ
Or elles, tt' tree ChOJ"• be graunte4 me
ro do that same thyng, or do 1 t nogh t,
'l!hout~ God farwoot it er that it w&A· wroght,
Or U his wit:'J'ing a~th nevet- a d&el·
aut by naoeseltee cond1oloneel.

The Nun' a Pr1eat ·"kan nat b',.lte 1t. to th• uren, • i.e,.'
he oannot a1f't it to the chatt •

Be cannot decide which

of

the

three anawera !a the correct one,· aa ean the holJ d.octOI'
AugQt1ne 1 or Boethiua, or B16o:P Bradwardine.

The t1rat v1n,

o• wh1oh he baa alread7 propoaed, 1a now put thuaa

"Wei thel' tlaat

tb1ng,"

Godde• worthy tol'W1tyng atreyneth me nedely tor to doon a
J

i.e., whether Gad•a
something•

tareknow~e

compels me neoeasa:ril'1 to do

!te explains 1n a parentheaia exactl-7 what he maal'la bJ'

"nedelJ'.• •Nedel.T' olepe I qmple necess:t tee. The

second

an..,. 1a that tree oho1oe 1s granted mm to do a tlllng or not to
do 1 ,, even though God lmowa beforehand what ohoioe w1U be ~··
In a word• there is no

knowledge.

repuananee

1n free 'Will nnd Ooclt • fore-

The th1rd an&lt'U' 1a that God • a forelmowleclge

SJrc>o•••

•concli t1onal neceaai tJ'·.~

About thoae three m awen Mr. Je.f:feraon

re~t

It 1D8.J' be b7 aec14en,,· 'bllt the three 41ft8J'ent v1ewa
preaented in th1a paasage are 1n accordance with the
dltf'erent poa1 t1ou held b)" tba t".llNe pb1los~a
men t1oned. B1ahop Brad-..rd1ne ardently uphelC! tore•
orcU.natlon ard waa opposed even b1tter17 to tne will.
He thought 1 t pre8W!tptuous for man to uaume tor h1Jitlit
aelt the reapoM1b1l1t7 or freedom ot aot1on. II•
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deemed all-aut.f1c1ent for man the divine grace. The
b1ahop Bra4war41ne, therefore, aignt be auppo1ed to
advocate 11 11mple meoeas1t71 " although he doe1 not
uae th1a. term bS.JueltJ the lfun' a Prie1\ parenthet•
ioall7 aasume1 that reaponsibility •••• at. Augult1ne
occupied the pol1t1on presented in the aeco~ view.
He bel1eve4 that tree will waa a gift from God to
man 0!117 in ao £u u God permi ttedJ hence the fol•
·lowtQg ~e& "Or ellea if free ehoys be 5raunted me.
Boethiua ..... entertained aa hla belief the doctrine
ot "conditional net•••it,r," mentioned here a1 the
third posa1b111t,r.
Aa Kr• Jettereon indicates in the

wo~

"It

mar

be

bJ accident,• Chaucer doea not aa7 that the three anawera belong
re1peot1-vel7 to the three 41¢ tariea he men tiona.

Be aerel7

st•e• the name1 ot thoae 11bo can "bulte it to the bren,• am then
pNaenta three solutions to the problem.
ur. Jetteraon attributea the firat anawer, that ot
aSaple neceas1 ty to Biab.op Bra41rardine.

In the following ohapte•

we ahall bave someth1ng more to sq about the position of th1a
prelate.

For the present 1t will suffice to remark that, though

hie ph1loaoph1o ideaa are aeer!:ingly quite determ1niat1o, he
neverthelela maintained that man has tree will.

He coul4 aouoe•

17 have r-ined a B111hop ot the catholic Church, i t he did not
-1nta1n the tree will of man.
The 1eoond auwer, aooord1ns to Ill'• Jefferson, should
be ••wibuted to

st.

Auguat1ne.

1a a toot-note, he 18711

comment11'lg on h11 own ob1ervatlon

st.

Auguatine considered the aubjeot ot tree will
in the Oi
of God, Book v1 Chap. VIII•XII. He ia
particUlar 7 conoel'ned in disproving the view of
cicero, who in \he I?! J)1'f'lnatione haa argued that
it 1a impossible to~both lhe foreordination of God
and the fztee will of man to exiat and that, since
a ohoio& between the two is necessiU'j 1 he prefers to
beU.Ye in the l.atter.a

If

OM

'f

conaulta the place mentioned b7 Mr. Jetteraon, he does not

t1n4 lt d1ft1oult to ••• the a11111ar1t,y pointed out bJ' h1m.

st.

Auguat1ne• a Y1ewa will be more tul-17 treated in the next chapter.

The r..arka ot the Bun•a Pr1eat concerning a1aple and
ooad1 tional neoeaa1 tr un401.1bted1:J come tl'om Book V ot the
couolat1one.

Jl!

The reader Will recall that Lad7 Ph1loaoph7 ln her

...... makea a d1at1nct1on between the aimple neoeaa1t7

ot tbl

.U. naing# an4 the oond1t10Dal neceaait7 ot the mara walld.n.g.
God. torelmew both that the

IRU1

would riae on a oerta n mornlDC<.;.

and that the man would walk, but ne-v.. thelua

11

•••••al7 and the latter tree.

the former action

La47 PhiloaophJ' doea not aq

idlat the aimple neoeaa1ty poa1t1on would oharaeter1se the

d1ao1ple•a viewa, but auch 1a ev1dent1J the oaae.a

section

a

I wol nat han to do of awloh •teereJ
M7 tale 1a ot a ook1 aa .,. •1 heere,

That tok hla oon~elJ. of hS.a -qt, w1 th • ....,.,
To walll:en in the 7erd upon tbat morn
186& That he hadde • t that clzteem that I 70ft tolde.
!he atmple chaplain will not Yenture further in high
pb11oMpb1ea1 apeeulat1on.

After all, he has a tale to tell•
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that of a cock who to h1a aorrow took the CO\Ul.ael of h1a wife,
of one who did not accept the a4vioe gi Yen him in a d.rea.

So

enda ;the paaaage trom the IN.n' a Prieat• a Tale on d1 vine .f'ore-

Jm.oWledge and bnma» .tree w111.
What do theae lines tell us about Chaucer• a own

attltnlde towarda tbe

prob~m

we bave been atw171:ngY

.f'lrat ot all, .that be waa 1ntere.ate4 ln the problem.

we know,
We know,

that be waa cogmaan t ot the continued dlaputationa concerning

it ln the aohoola.

we know that ·he waa aoqual. . . with the

pr1Do1pal aolut1ona put t'on81"4 to aolve the prebl••

We &l'e a

little inclined to euapeot that.be t'oun4 none o:r the aolution.abaolute~ oon'V'lno1~.

:RonYer, it ia one

~

to beline 1J1 a

tenet of a creed., and another to be able to explain 1 t.

JPitoa

Obauoer•a wol'ka w know that he belltWed. in ain, in 1\\Uiart
reapomt1billtJ'1 in merit, 1n reward, and punlahment.

wor4a, he believed 1ft human tree will.

In othell

JUat how tree will could.

'be reoono1led with God' a undoubted toNknowledge, he ap,Pal'entlJ'
414 DOt ••• cle&rl'J•

Perhapa the eolut1on waa

..s..ta J 1 t wa• not ao to hie.

app~nt

to great

In regprd to auch profOUDd. cptea•

tiona, l1lce h1a nun• • prieat, ve'r7 probabl7 1 he deoided that he
would. "nat

han to do

of' awlch matere.•

It waa tor- hbl to be-

lieve ln foreknowledge anc1.. tree will and not to expla1a their

reeono111at1on.
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wot•• to chapter IV

1.

Je!feraon, loco citato, P• 79

a.

-Ibid.

6'1

Chapter

v

THe Patr1at1o *04 8oholaat1c Anawer
It will help greatly to understand Chaucer••

att1~~e

toward the problem, and al.eo the plaoe the problQl itaelt baa tn

acholaet!.c ph1loaoph7, 1t a ehart h1atoP1cal aketch of 1t be

pvu..l The roa4el' 11111 reoall the former obapter 1n 1thlch a
._..,. of Boetld.uata tPea-.nt waa 81v•n•

It Will be well tt he

kMp 1D m1J1d some or the genePal pointe of that ohapter wbtle
•••UDB the following *-toh., and eapeei.allJ tlb.e taot \bat the

I?-

cou.,lat1~

Pb11oaop!a!ae • • WS.ttea 1n the eplJ' p•t ot U.

ata• oentnu-,·, wheN&e the Bun' • Pr1eat•a !ale and

-rmlu

all4

qs-tam• were oompoaed in the late 4eoa4ea ot the toua._th

••turJ·
The qu•tton regar41ng tbe reoono111at1.on ot tore•

kD.owleCSge aDi fr" wtll S.a • vef!7 old one.

It hu been M41tate4

upoa b7 ..,.,. ot tlw .s.aeet . . in blat_,..

some thinking tb.ere

waa

ao poeetble meana of rooono111atioa, denied either the tore•

lalowleqe ot 004 or the tree will of men.

Cicero, Marcua., Celaue,

ttepUJiua Parie1ene1a 4on1e4 that 004 can have torekaowle4ge ot
f'ltee will • ' • ·

tbat

The Fathera of the Ch'lll'oh 4e1'en4e4 the principle

Qo4 baa a perfect and oepteln foreknowledge of tree will

..-aa

thea &H TC"tulllan,

st.

aota •

Juatin Mart:Jr, CJT11 ot Alexan4r1a•

1\laUn• Greaor7 tM Gnat, Os-1sen and St• .Terome.

Even non•

Clarlat1an pb.lloiOphlttta, mQh aa A.IID.Ol'l1ua. Plots.nue, and Phllo
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~ defended thla principle. a

We have not1oM 1n Boetb1ua the ilrJportanoe whtoh the
Pino1ple that God lmowa the put and the future aa an eternal
l'eaent pla,-s in the reeonc111ttt1on t'4. tree will and foMknowl•

l&e•

He 1a bJ' no meane the onl.7 one who uaed th1a principle, nor

n4eed the tint one.
De

Th1a ))l'ino1ple 1a important beoauae on the

band 1 t ••••• the foreJcnowledge

or

God, aince 1 t penal ta God

o ••• oel'ta1n knowledge ot what 1a in 1taelf uncertalnj an4 c
b.e other hand., it pz-epapea the W&J" toz- aaY1ng tree w111, beoauae

noe we ahoW that tuture tree 11111 aota are preaent to God, it S.a

ot d1tf1cu1t to explaln how that Jmowleqe doea not neoeaa1 tate
bla.

Thoae who v.aect tbS.a pl'S.no1ple betoH Boethlua ue ON&Ol'J'

bl (}peat and. c,r11 ot Alex8l'ldr1a, anct tlhe non..Chr1at1a wr1 tea,

--.tua, Plotinua, and Philo.

Bea14ea tmeae oan be enumerated

'bb....a1ua, Ambroae, and 01'1g n.a

Orif, n, 1then

arguS.ns qainat

el.aa, one ot the t1ret to propoee the d1tt1oult7 ot reoono111ns
Cl'eii:Do1rle4ge and tree will, uaed the example of one mart beho141ns

notb.• tall1ng lnto a hole.

Aa tbe taot, be pointed out, that

b.e _. aeea the other talllng doea not make the ta111Dg

••••hl7

1

Ne

ao the tact that God hu torelmowleqe ot ov tuture

111.11 aota doe a not make thea neoeaa&PJ J tor God knowa them

ot ••

ru~·

eYenta but •• preaent onea. • .... ahall ••• ,

upat1ne too uea th1a method ot &l"gumentat1on.

It should be

et1oae4 tbat noil aU the w:ritera listed were trying to prove
bat

toreJc:anle4P doea not 1mpoae neceaa1 ty on tuture tree will

&t
aota, aa Or1gen waa in tbe example given.

some were •ral7 en•

4eavoring to show that God haa foreknowledge ot all things, tree
have been given to show that tJ:wT

will a4ta included.

Their

wet-e acquainted w1 t·

the principle.

n&n8 1

Another pr1no1ple which. as was shown 1n Chapter II 1

or

waa ade D11Ch

by Boetbiua waa that things do not happen beoauae

God tarelm.owa them, but He toretcnowa them beoauae thq will happen.
Ollce 70u adm1 t that Oo4 krlowa tu ture th1ng1 as ireaent, thia
pr1Jle1p1e 1a the next logi ca1 step.
future tb1qa 1a the aame u

out'

It Godt s foreknowledge of

Jo\ow1414ge ot preaent th!Dga, we

oaa. oonclwle log1oallJ' that a future event does not happen beoauae
Be fOI'eknowa tt, but on the oontra1'71 He Jmowa 1t beoauae it will

Julp{>4tn, just as the event tald.ng place before •

doea not happen

'beeau•e I know it, but I lmow 1t beoauae it 1• happening.

But 1t

thla !a. so. I cannot aay that Bla foreknowledge makea the . .ent
'

aeoeaaar117 happc. any more tball I oan ••7 that 11t1 lmowledge
malcH the action before me happen neoeaaarilJ'• ainoe ln both cue•

y_., a10h

the 1tn.o1t'1Mse preauppoa. . the extatenoe ot the o'bjeot.

u.s W.a aeoond

J.._,
st.

Ohl7aoatom, Ep1phanS.ua, CJr11 ot Alexandria,

AupatJ.ae, Alexander ot Halea, and

aeMI'al

tu

aot ta the
t:.be oaue

arts•,

principle, IUIICm6 th• the fol.l.ow1nga

u:p1lc1t interpretation
•••en~al

o~

Alber~

st.

Jlagrma.

Ana•hl,

In

the principle was that the

condition of the foreknowledge ot God, not

ot 1 t .
•• .,.. now prepared to oonaider tba ll'ld1v14ual men
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who oonts-ibute4 to the deYelopment of the acholaat1o anawer to
the problem.
~eatlon

The tirat w111 be st. Auguatine.

He oona14era the

in the De 01Y1tate Del. cap. lx and x.

Here he la

oh1efl7 oonoerne4 with retukt101l of Cicero, who ln

J)e

DlYlnatlone

denied that both tree will and the toreknowled&e ot God oan 1taDd.•
aa4 who conaequent17 denied the forelalowledse

ot

Goct.'

Firat ot all Ausuatine 41tferent1atea 'tJ'pea of
nMeaalty.

The neoeaaitJ of death 1a contrU'J to free will,

neoeaal t7 of God' a Uving d.oea not deatro7 111• tree will.

The

•an

baa

tlle uoeaa1ty ot Willing or not willlq, wb1oh 4oea DOt d.eatltOJ'
the freedom of the aotloa of w11Ung 1 taelt.

But oonoernS.Dc thla

utlon. doe a 1 t not haYe a .aeaai t7 wbloh 1a 1nooapat1ble wiidl
fJtee w11lf

happea.

'!'he Stoloa thousht

ot oauea la
will.

It muat be foreaeen bJ' God, and what 1a tor•••• llUt

•••••Al'7,

that what .baa a

Oel'ht.Jl, fixed. ......

and in auch a wq aa to preolude fJtee

Oloero had a a1m1lar belief.

He argued that lt God tore•

lmaw all th1nga. nob. a certain order of cauaea would WI'•

If

all thlnge are torelmown b7 God, ao aqa Oloero, the., will o-.

1a tile order in whlch thtJT are foreknown to ooae, IIDd. so will
laaYe a f1xe4 and oertatn order. · oonaequentl7 what 1a torelalown

'b7 God must happen b7 neoeas1t7. 'l'o thla Augustine annera that
lt 4oea not follow. that beoauae the OZ'du of the oauaea la onM.la

•

God., couecauentlJ' there ls no tree will.

OW.• 11'1Ua alao are

eaua•a, and aa auoh are a part ot that order of cautaea whioh la

••natll to God and la oontained in Hie toreJmowled&••

But i t Be
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s.. e.

oan Jmow theae oauaea,

our willa, He oan alao know that

s. t

S.a their nature to act treeq, and oan know how that fl-ee aetlcm

will take placeJ juat aa, although we muat be aware ot an aotion

we ue pert'ornd.ng, our k:Dowlec.t.ge cloea not ma1Ee 1t neoeaaU7 that
"

pert-o:r:ra that aet1on.

be

•an• in hia

•ne

at.

Auguatine expla1u more olearl.J' wb&t

tJ,bro Arb1tno.• 5

suppoae S.t 1a" trw., he

a-pea, that the torelmowled.p or God illlPo••• neoeaatty on tuture

tblaaa, ao

~t

on thla account aa.e one would atn ot n ...ae1t7•

It that were tJ-ue, he would ain ot neoeaaltJ' aolel7 b"auae
Go4' a torelalowledge.

or

But th1a 1a abaurd, tor CJ04•a torelcnowledge

ao mos-e 1mparta euoh a neoeaa1ty of a1nn1ng the J'O'IU' tOP.-..1•

ed.S• would, it you were to foreknOw that IIJOmeone would a ln. uatn.
aa J'OUI" _.,.., ot• aome aotlon of the peat doe• not btpoae

aeoeaa1t'7 on tlbat aot1on, ao neither d.oea Oo4•a torelmoWl•&a•

or

-..future.
ID another plaoe6 AU~W~t1ne aa,-a that 1t 1a not

•••••UT that a man dn_
••• b8 w:t.ll atn.

although 1t be neoeaHl"J' that God. tore•

But 1t Go4 t01-eaeea ~at be w111 a1n, he •••

oerta1n17 will atn, beoauae Godta tOI'eknowledge earmot be 4e-

o.S.vect.

OOd

tor•••••

ohooae to atn.
4o eo.

that.

the taot that the

DUr1

deUber&tel.7 will

It be did not wf.ah to atn, he would not have to

And 1t the man ob.oae not to a1n, GOc1 would alao toreaee

In the aeoon4 book ot the l'!!••t1onea a4

81mpl1o1~

Aupatlne, 11111e apeak1ng ot the nature ot Oo4• a torekMwleqe,

la7• 4cnm the pr1no1ple that

God

lmowa the tutiure

a1

1t 1t " "

ea
preaent.

we cannot hel.p not1o1ns how a1ad.lar 1n aar:\7 pet,aq 1a

the treatment ot Augustine to that ot Boe1Sbiua.
ba'Ye drawn heavil.J' on Augustine tor hia Book

The lat._ . .,

v.-

We 11111 now exud ne briefiy the oontztibut!.on ot.

aoe.as.ua. He :raat la7s down the principle

that God

know• the

'

futve and past as an eternal preaent.

Then ha. takea up the ob•

jeot1• that what God forelmowa a1at oom.e to paas. OTher• at-e ft'o
ll:la4a

ot aeoeaai t7•

oond1 tional and simple • oD17 one ot wb1. ~"h la

repuaunt to tree will.
simple
-

neo~usa1t7•

The aun•a rla1Ju1. would be an example ot

COD41t1onal neoeaa1ey ar1aea

wh0J11 you _aee walkil'lgt

~

1t, 1a 1mown.

1~ tha

OOIItl

troa the

a

nat~UJ:te

s. ••• ,

ot the will aot, but .troa the a441t1cm ot a ooa:U.t1on,
fltee.

ot

tor what 1a known oannot be othePW'iae

Thia neoeaa1t7 doea not

b.Owlqe of the beholder.

o•"•

the

'l'h\la 1n ltaalt the aot 1a perteotl7'

Refened1 hOwever, to the knowledge ot the beholder • 1 t la

neoea~arr.

so t:r-ee will ao ta derive a kind ot neoeaa1 ty trom the

Jcnowledge ot God.

Th1a mceaa1tJ' 1a oommonl.7 called

aoholaat1oa oon41td.onal, or oonaeg,uen;a, or

~.!!foa1teJ

a111011g

the

1&he other

1a tel"'Ud a!!lle, or antecedent, or d1 vlde4, or absolute. MaDS.•
im

teatl7 Boetbiua proved on the treatment
ot Augustine.
.
~

The next 1mportan t name tOP our consideration 1a tha•

ot .a.uelm. In h1a

"De couordia Praeao1ent1ae Dei oum L1bersate"

b.e •nata i:he queat1on akillfull.J•
torelmowleclge

or

The neeeaa1ty 1mpUe4 b7 the

GOd e1gn1t1ea nothing more than that beoauae a

thine Will e.ziat, it oannot at the same time DOt exist.

.Anaela
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oalla th1a neoesai tJ' oonaepent, and oppoeea it to the other
neoe.aa1 ty1 termed anteoe4ent.

'1'be anteoedent moeaai t7 oomea

before the exiatenoe ot the thing and is within ita oauaeJ the
oon.equent neceea1ty ia BliiUltaneous with the axlatence. o£ the

thlnc,

and follows n-om ita eslatence.

Be explains well the prin•

olple that the past and I'll tuMt ta wm eternal preaent to God, show•
l q 1ahat the tPM will aet, altb0\lf4l changeable in tt. . , la
obDaeleaa in etern1 t7, 'beoaua . thlnga are not in etern1 ty ao•
oordiag to ts.me.

Since it ia changeless in etern1t,", Goct oflft

biaft eternal ad" 1mau.table lcnotrl.Mge ot tt.

Omitting William of Parl•' who wrote uoellentl:J em
1ale question., we pua oa 1» the pril'lM

••oleslau, at. 'lbollaa Aquiu.e.
tmd. oGapletelJ'•

Book

v

ot phlloaophara aDII

He expla1na the pl"'blem lucldl:r

In h1a tr•1aeat we tlnd lllloh to relllnct. ua of

of Boethlua.

In De VerS.tate8

5ben are· two ••7• 1n whicb

4M1de bow God Jmowe

Mn

oont1~~gent

st.

!beMa tJella ua that

han goae wztQbC 1n tl')'lng to

be1nga.

aome,

Peduclng Jlia

llaoWl•dg• to the leTel ot ours, denied that Be knowa thea at all.
!hl• will not do 'beeauae thel'e could be no divine pl'OVldenoe ot

. _ . &tfalra which are oonti.Dgent.

On the other hand, aoae haYe

aa14 that God fe&'elmon all, and that .. 1 thll'l6• happ• with

uoeaatqo.

But thla -.kH t'Pee wlll

lapoaa1ble.

UDJuat, punllb.•nt tOft' ala and reward top virtue.

_., ••1 that GOd Jcn.owa all tutun th1nsa.

It would l'eader

There1"ore, ••

and. doea eo w.t thout

bl.._.1ng the event of 11117 oont1ngent be1q.

Th1a Une or

thoqht relld.nda ua of Book V of De

Oonaolation.e.

Bwor comea from. the t"aot that the object la not
lalowa as 1t 1e.

Bow nothing oan prevent a neoeaa&F,V th1J11!!! htoa

happening• a1nce· lta oauna are s..ttably ordered to 1ta pro4uo•

ua.. Oonaequentl.J'. neoeas&rJ things can be

U~U~~Pl•• the

.-n een thq _.. .tuture, ••· ror

-a.•t.q. ··beoauae

OM oan~

known w1 th cert1 tude •

1'1alng

or

lntef••· With the ao1i1on ot lta

h ' ._. 1t 1a aotua117

jn:10duoe4~

tb• •Wl•

oaua•••·

ita proc.\uot1on cannot be

lalaclered, &114 on thia aooount 1t 1a posaible to have oeMain

Jmowlqe about 1 t.

a..ratea

Por ••IIPl•• -.. baa a oeru.t.a

a1tl when be behold• see•atM a1tt1:a&•

J~t

tllat

bOll t=Jd.a lt ta

olear tsbat oae eaDD.Ot haft oe..s.n Jcaowle4ce about c•ttaseat .
t4'llnsa 1n ao tar •• thq • • event• ot the

tuin.artt,

but lt ~.,.·are

pea•t to bbl, be ou.

Thua God can ha't'e oertaJ.a lmowledge

.tv.twe oont1rcent thlnsa

~· Be

or

know thea •• lt. the7 .,....

. . . . .,. 'lh!a will be cl.__., perhape, fit• the tol.l.o'trt.q ex•

-.1••

I ••• J1aD7 peop~ puelng .u.ooeaa1ve1J' tb.Jtouah a

-... tor

BOlle

t1••

~

BOW the paaaage

eaoh of theu

sa•,

s- opJA

aNI

1D

-particular aoment of the tS... I stood there ... present to

••

....ver, the paaaaae ot al.l

tt.,.

Jalolrle4p . .

aU the

tsoo. as..al,

er

thea O&llmOt 1M

s. ••••

paa~, ~aen11. ·&ld tutl.lre

preeent to ...

1t fill' Jmotraclge eoul4

~14

1a ou ..,..laatlns peaent

•*•

J eeuld bebo14 the preeents paaeqe ot all ot them 1ft the . . .

,••••t ot tlM,

and tbla deapite the tu~ that

tiber d.o not all

paaa tl:lNup the gate at the • - tiae bu' euooesal••l7•

The
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41. y1Jla knowledge ia tot. a111lll, since it is eternal, and eteMl1•

11 ilota ai!IUlJ

Wl1a la

a&~

yet God' a knowledge embrace a all time.

Since

lt beholda Whatne will take place in time not aa

t\ltulte but aa preaent.

we behol4 the future aa tutu:Jte, beoauae

we are bound 'b7 time, and 1n .time events are future to us.

Aa we

ue .aot deoe1ve4 when we behOld oont1J18ent eventa happen1ng 11'1
the.

PJ~efent, ·and.

nevertb.eleaa do not

by

our knowledge binder thea

tnm. J;lappent.q oonttng•tl71 eo God oan know

tu~

eYenta with

oertltru.d•• and w1 tt:out lnterters.ns With their happ.an1ng
'

"flttaae~tlJ' •

.Ute tb.ia eJQt1anat1on st.

Joetta1u.

~~ ~•t•r•

d1reot17 to

Boethlua• t. ,.,.., oonaiclered lt t.noorreot to apN.k

ot the • :toremow1eq.• of God, b4toauae there 18 r•all:T no lmowl•

qe 1rJ. Oo4 ot

the

ltlture •• tuture. st. Thomaa

~»xt

anawva the

o'D3eo\1oa8 la propoaed. b.t'OJ-e he entered into the loll& esplarat1on

.J ua.t

glven.

I a theae aNtWezta he aqa a tew thlDP 'lbloh lbou14

be actS.-.4 ure.

.A future ocmt1n&8Jlt

tftth ln ltaelt, but lt ..._. haft a

be1na

oauae,

ha8 AO

4etenlned

anc1 God. oan know tlbat

oauae. It la uo••Ml'7• s. ••• , 1lb.e tuiNH oontlngent belq. !D the
8eue that onoe lt 4tld8t8• 1 t oennot .at the 8... t1• not at at.
094 know• 1t aa lt it axl8ted•

ot St. Anaelata

~.)

1a that :tt la 1mown b7 Oo4J

('rhia 14ea

wa• noted ln treatbs

It le neoe8aUT1 not 1n S.taelt. but

__.•t•• 1n the ord.R ot c

objeo•

te lta oopltlOll• Wbat 18 at1'1'1bu\ed. to a th1J'll aooording to 1ta

.-n aature 18 a part at ita being, but 'lllhat la attn'butac! t1a lt
t.a eo tar &8 1 t la Jraown, 18 at..S.buted to 1t aooord.l~_ to the
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nature of the lmowleqe ot 1 t.

M7 1ntelleot lalowa thlnga 1m-

-ur1&U7, but t.b.ia 1mmater1al1 tr which the thing hu ia not ot

i'aelt but ot 1111' intellect.

To God a future contingent being la

preaent and. neoeaaarr, but tbia presence and neoeaa1t7 1a not ita

own

l)ut

is o1' God• a intellect.

Therefore, it I aee seorawa

Jl'\lDDS.ng, be ru.u J and 1t God. lmowa a future th1ng, that tbS n& w111

'bel l:totb of theae are neoeaa&l"J Wbile thq are ex1at1ng, and the7

are .as.atln& ln a aenae beoauee thq are present.

st. tthomaa e44a .ol'e
1a bla oo~~Mnt&l"J

l!!

to hia

trea11aent ot the pr<>bl•

reri.hel'meaelu Ar1atoteua.9 !he valuable

utter it contain• 'ft.l'ranta ita Vanllation in fulla
God 11 altogether outa14e the order ot time.
Be ia ltalld1ne, as 1t were, upon the high o1UA.el ot
uaal.teabll etemltJ'• Before BS.a 1a aprea4 out the
eole oovee ot tiae, which Be takea 1a b7 oM elmple
lntultloa. oonaequentl.J, b7 one aot ot v1a1cm., Be
•••• eveJ7thS.Dg that bappeu 1n the ooUI'ee of t1aeJ
m4 eaoh fact Be Hea u it S.a ln 1taelt1 not u . _ .
tJdng tlhat 1a to be preaent to Hie
1D the tt.tin~Jte,
and. ia tor the pJteact lnvolve4 1D the aequenoe of
oauaea on whlah 1t depend.at at the aame t1• He alao
aeea that aequeu.oe ot oauaea. Be aeee eveJ!7 event 1D
a anner altogether proper to 8Jl etel'Ml being. · boh
taot, to 1fh&Mve period ot tlme S.t 'belonse, He aeea
even aa the h't.man •7• •••• sooratea aeated. The
a1tt1ng ltaelt, n.ot lta oauae, S.a . . . b7 the ..,.••
·Bv.t troa the tut ot a an .aeet.as aooratea aeated., 1 t
atat not be 1nterre4 that the sitting 1• • etteot
tlowill& trCD ita oav.ae •••••ar11J". On the other
hmd, the ,......... •7• ••••
trul7 an4 1nta1Ub1J'
aooratea aeated. wb11at he N&ll7 1• aeate4, bHauae
eYer7thln8, •• 1 t 1a S.n 1 uelt, 1a a t1ze4 u4 4eHnd.ne4 tact. 'lhUa, then, we muat admit ~t Ood.
Jmowa 1d.th abaolute eerta1nt.J' aad 1ntal11b111ty whateve ha,ppeu at aDJ' time. 11ever~leaa tnaporUT
.veta do DOt happen of neoeaait"J't_ but are the etteota
of oauaea that mif>ht have acted. 01Ulen1ae.

sa••

••t
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In the augumentlat1on ot

st.

Thomas Just g1Yen the

reader oarmot help but aee Jll\lch a1Dd.lar1 t7 to the matter or the
t1ttb. book

or

the De Ocmaolat1one.

We have now g1 von br1erl.7 the patr1at1o and aohoU.t1c

Jo1utton ot 1be probl.em ot the r•oono111s.tlon ot d1v1Jle tore•
lmowledge anct .traaan tree wlll.

Let ua now re....rt to the 11nea 11l

whloh Chaucer J8D11'eeta hla 1ntel'eat 1n thla problem.
'1lhe

laraentJ.Ds '!'ro1lua la 1n a state ot

doubt.

that all huan" act1ona are neo.. a1Cate4.

tor •ere are atrong argumenta on

Aa we ..,;

He tench to bell"•

Yet he cannot be 8UI'e,

tb6 oth•r atM.

M&JQ"

a sreat

ol.atk baa taught to:reor41natlcm, but J11aD7 an other hu clal-.4
tbat aothlng co•• ot Mceu1Q'.

ale18t1e

a1"'l

It 11 all ve7!J oo:ntua1ng•. •so

clerlcea ol4e, t.l".l:d I ao't moe GPJ'D70Uil :t •7 ho!Ae·•lD

A oerkln e!.Jdlaztl ty can be to\md in tb.e l'wl' a PJt1ea-tt a

'l'll'Ue, he 1a not at aU deapa1r1ng •• is !ro1lua.

attl Wd.e.

But the

a...-a.,
tor.-

and he 1a aoqu.aln 1*1 W1 th them. or thoae who would aolve the

Jalowleqe tree w111
Yiao..S.

prob~a

le••• h1a at .leaat ae.S.nglJ'

Such anawera ar-e contra.41otoJT.

17 ••oluble. There

UBC-..

1'be probl. . 1a appaz'e.nt•

haa been peat altercation 1n the acahOola,

Ul4 peat 41aput1ng about th1a question, and eYer baa been ........

a Jaa:adre4 tb.w.aarui mea.

J. t

h&Ye to do wltb the atte.

is too •oh ro:r h1m.

Be wlll not

He wtll "proceed with bia tale ot

CbaaUoleer.
Oertalnl.Jt. tale linea b-oa Troll:u.a and crla!J!! G4

t.roa the Wuata Pr1eatts Tale

man1~•·~

a certain

aoept1o1a~

T.bia
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scepticism does not necessarily co:,oern the cath ?l1c dog:maa
0

God' a fat'eknowledge and

!l'!An Is

.free w1 ll.

01·

It has to do rather

with the a.rc;ur:1onts,. der'Lved from hu.t."lan reasor,, W"ieh !'1en have

brought forward to show that there is no repugnance between ~uch

foreknowledge and .free will.

Whence comes this aceptioal attitude

of mind which Chaucer• s characters display?

trom Boeth1us,

mom,

It does not come

as we have seen,. Chaucer followed closely.

rt doftll not co:·,e from the illustrious fathers and scholastics
whose views we hnve briefly sketched.

The historical resume haa

shown that they were well agreed on the whole matter.

of one develops and completes that of the other.

The work

What shall we

say then of the Nun•1 Priest's hundred thousand clerks and their
wranglinga?
Perhaps the history o.f those mediaeval philosopher1,
known as "Nom1nal1sts" will throw sorie 11g)lt upon the matter

Chauoer•s attitude.

or

~ccording to Petav1us, leading Nom1nal1sta,ll

a ch ns William Occam, Gabriel Biel, and :;rep.:ory R1m1n1, did not

hesitate to declare unsoluble the proble~ of the reconc1llat1on
of God•s f,Jreknowlec.1.ge

and

man•s t·ree will.

'.L'heir views were

sufficiently current in Chaucer•a time, so that he could have been
aoquainted w1 th them.
Monsignor Pohle r~.,.tnds ua 12

thRt the death o£ Duns

Sootua. marks the close of the golden era of the scholaat1o system,

am

that the period 1300-1500 represent& its deol1ne.

What thia

period accomplished 1n constructive work consists in oreservinr,
and digesting the results o.f the former age.
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lt..altaneoua 111 t~ this good labor are

ele;,~enta

or

d1a1ntep-at1on,

4UI partl7 to the t&lae 14eaa of mJst1o1aa of the Frat1oell1 1
partl7 to the aberat1ona and aupert1o1al1 tea of the HOJI1nal1ata,

am partly to th• 41atr•••1ng oontUc;t of ohUJ'Oh and atat..

'!'be

development ant! rapid spread ot JJOid.nallam. ln BDgland at l8 aat,
.ut be aaol'1be4 malnl7 to W1111aa Occa, who d1... 111 1K'7.

tueta

~

'I'M

xomS.ultaa were well Jmown 1n England in the last

4Ma4ea ot the fOQl'teenth oentu17• when Cb&Uoal" eote zro11u

P4

C£1 88lJ!I aD4 the
3

JfUnf a

rrte•t' a Tale. A.a the Jrowtnaltata

..S.ata1ne4 that the toreaowlqe•t••• td.ll probl• waa tuo1\lble,

1t _,.be that thelr teuhing f1J:&4a an echo 1n tM aoept1oal
raualca ot Chaucer• a

oharaot•••

Perhaps another a()UitCe of Usht oa Cuuoar' a a•tttud.e
1a to be tou.n4 in the teaohlng of Blabop

ltJ' tJ:ut

BUn'•

~.

Mfe....S. to

Pr.leat, tosetbe with All8Wit1ne •4 Boetb1ua, u

a

ntllorlt7 on the queat1-. ot the HOOAC1Uat1on ot foNDowlqe
U4 IN• 11111.

B~•

aa born. about 1170 1ll ton.4on. ad

41. . la the aame oltJ' about the

l.M9.

780

Be atta1ne4 ,....,.

t... u a theologS.a. Bla isheologS.oal leoturea, dell veNd at

o.t.a,
1lt

were ..,_484 into hla

.f&a~Gua

treatise on sraoe, eatltlecl

IM'I Rd !!IE• £•61119 et 4e v1£tllte oaul£9!! 111 fill

•••nan••••
ebV'Oh an4

Arter holding v&rS.oua prOIId.nent oftlcea in the

state, be waa aa4e .b'Obbiahop or can.terbuJ7 1n 1569,

the 7e&r ot hla 4eath.

Hia

~

reputation aa a aoholar na

'buecl not ofl17 on the theoloaioal treatiae meationect, but on hla

'10

ma'Cbwaatical worka aa we11. 13
Aa R· Seeberp:

~vea

it, the sum of BradWIL1'41ne' a

theolop:ioal teaohl.llS!: 1a aa followat
GOd ia COJIQ;)le te per fee t1on and soodneaa, ia Sood
action itself• free trom the potent1.alltj ct S:mperteo1d.Dil• He 1a no' ·Uid.·te4 llJ' 11Nltal1 't7• Jle .i.a
tne first oauae, the absolute principle ot being
IUld JD.Otioa. 'lbel'etore. DO one t.lan aot, nor oan
&n:Jthina "bappa" J God works or Glide!' a •••nta.
.
· D1•1ne toftlaloW1e4ge 1a will uero1•e4 1ons ~ore.
01' prede•t1nat1on ot (Ml'l' a) will.
Go4t • w111,
.no"f'8r1 1e unoban&t.~· Evet7tb.lns Hkea place ~
virtue ot the 1D1'1Utable .antecedent neoeaa1 tJ' oauaed
b7 tM 41 vtae vo11 tlon. senoe man can aq nothiftl
••" u.aeful or ett1oac1oua • • • than ' th7 will 'be
4ou• t • The .rr.-ta et. pre4eat1nat1cm are the gittl
ot
ln the present, juat1t1oat1on froa a1n,
....., fit .-it., ._....,_.~• to the en4, and t~DeD41Jll
b11aa in Ul8 'world to oo.. The reault ot th1a 11ne

sr•••

ot

thoqht 1•t· of c. out!'. ., 4aterm1n1aa ot a ~at4o
t7P8• !Jl apl-. of tbia ~~ BM4War4inei
Auauat1u. uaerted the reality of tree wil •

H-

With auch 4etenasntatto teaoh1Jll( ourrent in En&lalld .... and
Ohauoer app.rentl.J' knew aolll8tbl~Sg of BradWAI'd1De and hla 'teaohi.Dg
.... it 11 Uttle wonder that the traditional dootr1ne o£ the

father• a4 aoholaaUo• abould be ob•oured.

Apparentl,. too.

there ia aoae r ...on. tf:r the loept1o1• man1.feete<l b7 Tro1lua
and the

}lunt a

Pl'ieat.

1.

Thie Jlla.tter ot tbla hiator1e&l aketoh 1s taken
from the following bookea

iamt1o

!heolo~,

~rgel.J'

by Dionysiua Petaviuo, S.J., new
IV, co. VI.YYTt, (Parle, V1Yea 1 1886)•

!~Book

&h, V81.

l»7 Jla&r•
b,- &t!iur 'reua•,. (!t. t:ou1a, Harder,

God!. H11 n'U~ B•MM•t 84 Attribuha,

Joiei&

Pili1~apt

ltll}, PP• 181-34'1.

•• ot.

worn •nt10De4 above.

-

3.

Ot. Petav1ua, l.o., PP• 164 ff.

t.

cicero,

a.

~

J!! D1vU.t1one, II, '1.
Ubeto pb1tr1o, er...- y·rt an4

IV·

a. De Gratia Obriatl, Lib• I, Oap. III•
v. mx ·1¥'• c7;• umver., par. III, eap. xv. xn.
a. ~ ver1tat.e, e41td.o nov~ !'urtn, Jlaretu, 1931•
•· , . v . .lat.t.Oil
&oe44er,

s.J•,

PP• 1'71478..

10.

~U.U.. &lid

11 Mken r.oa ...~ 'lbeolol' W • ......_
('lew YorJt. LOn&'iini, diae~
oo. a lilt) 1

a

Orl!!df.- IV, IJ'I8,.9'71.

u. ct. ,....,.1ua. page 166.
oac..Uo J!1U8!eJ!!1&1 Vol.
&bl4••

Q..tt,Art.tUI

XIV, P• &98.

P• 81S.

Wew

-~-IMP.1~-a
Of l•ff!!ou.a ~~
tli'l 'f'IR;
·~ ~ ~ x-,t m: ~,. •~

'!'be
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chapter

n

conolua1on

The purpoae ot th1a •hea1a waa to .xud.ne Vle vi. .a
espreased 1n the worka ot Ohauoer on the aubjeot of 41Ylne tore• ··
knowledge and buman tree will, .with r.tereDOe, eapeclallJ, .to the

••••• ot Boethiua an4 to the teaohl.ng ot the Pathera

aD4

the

aobolut1o wntera ot the Catho11o Churoh •. Thla taak baa now
'bea aooolfPU&bed, and 1t 1a to be hoped. that the Chauco1an
paaaqea in which auch v1ewa are expressed have been made eo••

wbat .,.. 1rltell1s1ble.
It 1a Nroeaaa1'7, t1naJ.17. to ma up, and perhapa to

a.p11fJ, wnat h .. alre.., been aa14 reaar41ng chaucer•• ow.a
attitude to the problea ot the reoono111at1on ot

edl•

and man•• tree w111.

~Ubtedl.7

God'•

t~l

Firat ot all, 1t llUat be akte4 b t

Chaucer, aa a Oathol1o bel1eYe4 in the exlat-.e bftilll

ot 41 vine torelmowledge and human tree will.

'M&n7

paaaas•• 1n

thepoet• a wrka oould be o1te4 to S.lluatrate h1a bellet aot

cm17

1a aa all•lalow1ng God, l:R.tt alao 1n auoh atattera aa a1n, l»\Mil
reapoD81b1UtJ', •r1t, and reward, all ot wh1oh !.mpl7 the edat-

enoe ot tree will 1n man.

Moreover. ••en the Jfom1ul1ata of

Obaue• a time, and Bishop Bra4wu-41ne, thougt their ph11oaopla.•

1oal -.peeu1at1ona were ratblr &WJl7, proteaaed their b•l1et ln ba•
lla1l

tree will.
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But, aa we have aa1d, there la a certain aoeptiolam
41apla7ed in the linea of 'l'l'011ua

am

Prleat' • Tala wh1oh we have exud.ned.

cr1ae,l4e and the

Th1a aoept1c1am 4oea not

oonoem, so 1 t aeema to ua, the dogmas of
will.

:wun• a

toreknowled~e

and tree

It haa to do rather w1 th the arguments, d.rawn from. human

peaaon, which have been brought torwar4 to llhow their non•
repuplll'lee.

Even allowing tor the taot that what Ohauoer• •

oharaotera aq need not retleot the 1ntelleotual oon.1o tiona ot
thea oreator, at111 1 t 1a hard to eaoape ·the 1mp:reea1on that the
poet blmeelt regarded the 1'oJtelmowle4ge•tl-ee Will problea u

•or• et IIJ"Btel7,
aat1ataot1on,

a

aometb1ng not to be aolv..S to ">M' a coaaplete

ft'O

b7 the areateat

or

clerks.

It JDa7 well 'be

that Chaucer waa 1ntlueno«t 1n h1a vine on tbta au.bJ••• b7 \he

\eaob1ng ot the 1fOJI1nal1ataJ or that the rather d.etei'Jdn1at1o
pb11oaoph)" ot •n like Btahop Bnd.waN.!ne (Who neftl'tbeleaa aaln•·

•at•4 their ballet in bee wtll) obac,.e4 tor him the ta-.utlrm.al
paw1at1c and. eoholaatio aolut1on.
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